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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DOPING IN SPORTS AND THE USE OF STATE POWER
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN,* ELIZABETH BANGER**
& MATTHEW M. WRIGHT***
Within the world of sports, a war against the use of performanceenhancing drugs has been waged since the late 1960s. Beginning in the late
1980s, however, the use of drugs in sports, generally referred to as “doping,”1
began to attract the attention of the government. After a series of hearings in
1988, 1989, and 1990, Congress placed anabolic steroids on the list of
controlled substances, making it a felony to distribute them for non-medical
purposes,2 and amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to make it
a felony to distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute, human growth
hormone (HGH) other than to treat disease.3 When the dietary supplement
* Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law, Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case School of
Law, and Professor of Bioethics, Case School of Medicine. The author wishes to thank Dawn
Richards for her help with the manuscript.
** J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2007.
*** J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2006.
1. The term “doping” is used to refer to the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports
in general. See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 517 (26th ed. 1995). The term “blood
doping” technically refers to the practice of infusing blood, either the athlete’s own (autologous)
or someone else’s (homologous) in order to increase the number of red blood cells, which carry
oxygen. See American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Blood
Doping, Report B-I-85 (1985), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/
ceja_bi85.pdf.
2. See Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts
to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 5 (2005)
[hereinafter Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime] (opening statement of Chairman Tom Davis).
Congress placed steroids in Schedule III of the list of controlled substances. Id. Substances on
Schedule III have a lesser potential for abuse than the drugs or other substances in Schedules I
and II, have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of these
substances may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 202, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3) (2000).
3. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §1904, 104 Stat. 4789, 4853 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2000)). As originally proposed, section 333(e) was to read:
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human growth
hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other recognized
medical condition pursuant to the order of a physician is guilty of an offense punishable
by not more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are authorized by title 18, United States
code, or both.
15
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manufacturer BALCO was accused of concocting and distributing steroid
analogues, known as designer steroids,4 that could not be detected by existing
tests and that technically were not covered by the Controlled Substances Act,
Congress amended the Act in 2004 to close this loophole.5 In the winter of
2005, the U.S. Senate launched an investigation into the allegations of steroid
use amongst baseball players.6 Senator John McCain threatened to revoke
baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust laws if it did not clean up its
players.7 Later hearings targeted professional basketball and football.8 And in
his first State of the Union message since the invasion of Iraq, President Bush
declared:

Steroid Trafficking Act of 1989, S. 1829, 101st Cong. § 201 (1989). This would have allowed
physicians to prescribe the drug for any purpose, in keeping with their traditional power to
prescribe drugs for “off-label” uses—that is, for purposes for which they have not been reviewed
and approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The final language of the amendment,
however, reads:
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human growth
hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other recognized
medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services under section 355 of this title and pursuant to the order of a physician, is
guilty of an offense punishable by not more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are
authorized by Title 18, or both.
21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (emphasis added). This suggests that physicians may only prescribe HGH
for purposes for which the FDA has approved. The meaning of the phrase “where such use has
been authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 355” is difficult to
ascertain, since it is so poorly drafted and there is no clarifying legislative history. If it truly
means that HGH cannot lawfully be prescribed for off-label uses, then it represents an
unprecedented government invasion of physician decision-making autonomy.
4. See Jack Curry, 4 Indicted in a Steroid Scheme That Involved Top Pro Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A1. In February 2004, four men associated with BALCO were indicted
on charges of illegally distributing steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs to athletes
and making a concerted effort to conceal the distribution by using code words to refer to the drugs
in communications with athletes. Id. The indictments were issued against Barry Bonds’ personal
trainer, a prominent coach of several Olympic track and field athletes, and two executives of
BALCO following a two-year investigation of the company, during which an empty box of vials
of serostin (a human growth hormone), empty containers of testosterone and Oxandrin (anabolic
steroids), an empty box of Epogen (a prescription version of erythropoietin) and dozens of
syringe wrappers were found in the trash outside the company’s offices. Id.
5. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, § 2195, 118 Stat. 1661
(2004).
6. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2.
7. See 150 CONG. REC. S3997–3998 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain).
8. Steroid Use in Sports Part II: Examining the National Football League’s Policy on
Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter NFL Hearing]; Steroid Use in Sports Part III: Examining the National
Basketball Association’s Steroid Testing Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter NBA Hearing].
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To help children make right choices, they need good examples. Athletics play
such an important role in our society, but, unfortunately, some in professional
sports are not setting much of an example. The use of performance-enhancing
drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other sports is dangerous, and it
sends the wrong message—that there are shortcuts to accomplishment, and that
performance is more important than character. So tonight I call on team
owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the lead, to send
the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.9

States have not directly addressed doping in competitive athletics.
However, most states have updated their controlled substance acts to reflect the
federal stance against anabolic steroids.10 They have also made additional
efforts to regulate steroids in schools and to disseminate information about the
dangers of anabolic steroids.11
What accounts for this intrusion of government into the private world of
sports? By what authority does government act? And most importantly, how
does this bode for the legal status of use of biomedical enhancement outside of
sports?
I. THE HISTORY OF DOPING IN SPORTS
The use of performance-enhancing substances is probably as old as
competitive sport itself.12 Records from the earliest Olympics reveal that
athletes drank herbal beverages to give them energy.13 During the late 19th
century, competitors ingested a variety of substances, including caffeine,
cocaine, strychnine, and alcohol.14 The term “doping” comes from the 19th
century Dutch word “dop,” the name for a potion that Zulu warriors consumed
to help them vanquish their foes.15 In 1904, Thomas Hicks won the Olympic
marathon after drinking French brandy, strychnine, egg whites, and sponges of
warm water served to him from assistants in an automobile.16 In 1924, former

9. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
10. See Appendix A for a table detailing how states have chosen to schedule drugs.
11. See Appendix B for a complete list of state laws relating to steroids.
12. World Anti-Doping Agency, History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/
dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312 [hereinafter WADA Anti-Doping History] (last visited Jan. 4,
2006).
13. See id.
14. Michele Verroken, Drug Use and Abuse in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT 18, 18 (David R.
Mottram ed., 2d ed. 1996).
15. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12.
16. Id.; Mary Delach Leonard, St. Louis Hosts Olympics, STLTODAY.COM, Jan. 13, 2004,
http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/special/pd125.nsf/0/A67FC7DF8E1F5EF686256E12004
D3ADD?OpenDocument.
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Tour de France winner Henri Pelissier showed the contents of his medicine bag
to journalists: cocaine, chloroform, and various pills.17
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the performance-enhancing drugs
of choice primarily were stimulants and calmatives. Athletes continue to
employ these types of substances, including amphetamines and beta-blockers
(used in shooting competitions to improve accuracy by slowing the heart
rate).18 In the mid-20th century, attention shifted to two primary objectives.
The first was to increase the number of red blood cells in the circulatory
system. Researchers discovered that with higher levels of red blood cells,
more oxygen gets to the tissues, improving the athlete’s energy and
endurance.19 In the 1970s, a Swedish sports physician developed what became
known as “blood doping”—the use of blood transfusions to increase the
number of circulating red blood cells.20 The next breakthrough came with the
development of recombinant DNA manufacturing technology. This enabled
drug companies in 1985 to synthesize erythropoietin (EPO),21 a naturally
occurring substance that stimulates the manufacture of red blood cells.22
Lately, athletes have taken to sleeping in artificial atmospheres, so-called
nitrogen tents and “houses.” These mimic the effects of sleeping at high
altitudes, which increases the blood’s capacity to carry oxygen.23
The second major goal of modern performance enhancement in sports has
been to grow more muscle tissue. The chief substances of interest have been
hormones known as anabolic steroids.24 These have been commercially
available in the United States since 1958, although their development was a
long process.25 The process began in the 1920s when researchers first
17. Tim Moore, History, Drugs and the Tour de France, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/tg/feature/-/187085/202-3712162-0701452.
18. See Ron Kroichick, Lab Scandal Brings Issue of Steroids in Sports to the Forefront, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003, at B1.
19. IVAN WADDINGTON, SPORT, HEALTH, AND DRUGS: A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE, 146 (2000).
20. Id.
21. Fu-Kuen Lin et al., Cloning and Expression of the Human Erythropoietin Gene, 82
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7580, 7580–82 (1985).
22. John M. Tokish et al., Ergogenic Aids: A Review of Basic Science, Performance, Side
Effects, and Status in Sports, 32 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1543, 1547 (2004).
23. Id.
24. Anabolic steroids are distinguished from estrogenic steroids, progesterogenic steroids,
and corticogenic steroids. Estrogenic and progesterogenic steroids are derived from estrogen and
progesterone, respectively, and are widely used for hormone replacement therapy in women and
as hormonal contraceptives. WILLIAM N. TAYLOR, ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND THE ATHLETE, 168
(2d ed. 2002). Corticogenic steroids are anti-inflammatory agents and are often used in
conjunction with analgesics. See Karl Heusler & Jaroslav Kalvoda, Between Basic and Applied
Research: Ciba’s Involvement in Steroids in the 1950s and 1960s, 61 STEROIDS 492, 499 (1996).
25. See JOHN M. HOBERMAN, MORTAL ENGINES: THE SCIENCE OF PERFORMANCE AND THE
DEHUMANIZATION OF SPORT 266 (1992).
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attempted to isolate testosterone, which was not accomplished until 1935.26 In
subsequent years, research on testosterone focused on clinical applications, and
when the anabolic-androgenic steroids were first marketed, they were used to
treat burn victims.27 However, testosterone’s muscle-building properties were
already well known, and it was rumored that Soviet athletes had been using
testosterone to great effect starting in the 1950s.28 With high demand for
steroids, pharmaceutical companies began to synthesize them in earnest and by
the mid-1960s, more than a dozen anabolic steroids were on the market for
medicinal purposes.29
Studies examining the effects of anabolic steroids followed. From the
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, approximately twenty scientific studies were
published on the potential ability of anabolic steroids to increase strength and
muscle mass.30 Opinion was divided. Half the studies claimed that anabolic
steroids did have such properties, but the other half disagreed.31 While the
scientific community remained split, anecdotal evidence was mounting that
steroids were, in fact, extremely effective in their ability to improve muscle
strength and mass. Anabolic steroids were also increasingly popular among
athletes, particularly weightlifters and track-and-field competitors.32
Breakthroughs in performance enhancement in sports are now beginning to
flow from the revolution in human genetics.
Recombinant DNA
manufacturing has allowed unlimited quantities of HGH to be produced.33
Many athletes believe that HGH, previously available only from the pituitary
glands of cadavers, can increase the size and strength of muscle tissue and
decrease body fat via enhanced protein synthesis and a mobilization of fat
tissue.34 In addition to its perceived anabolic benefits, some athletes also
believe that HGH can strengthen and prevent damage to tendons, prevent stress
fractures, and speed the healing process after injuries.35 Another genetic
intervention that is beginning to impact athletics is genetic testing.
Researchers have discovered genetic variations associated with the ability to
run short and long distances respectively.36 In Australia, a genetic test for this

26. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 178.
27. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144.
28. Id.
29. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 17.
30. Id. at 111.
31. Id.
32. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144–45.
33. See Verroken, supra note 14, at 23; P.H. Sonksen, Hormones and Sport: Insulin, Growth
Hormone and Sport, 170 J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 13, 18 (2001).
34. Sonksen, supra note 33, at 18–19.
35. Id. at 21.
36. E.g., Nan Yang et al., ACTN3 Genotype Is Associated with Human Elite Athletic
Performance, 73 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 627, 627 (2003).
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variation can now be purchased for approximately $100.37 It is conceivable
that athletes, teams, schools, coaches, and parents will employ the test to
identify the running sport best suited to individual genetic profiles.
In the future, gene transfer technology may allow more exotic
interventions. Gene therapy can be used to manipulate the chemical signals
involved in normal muscle repair to stimulate and augment the process.38 The
sports community is closely watching research on the use of gene therapy to
treat muscle-wasting diseases, because the same techniques could be used to
grow and nourish muscle in healthy persons. The emerging field of
pharmacogenetics, which uses genetic testing to individualize drug treatment,
also could dramatically increase the safety and effectiveness of performanceenhancing drugs in sports.39

37. Chip Le Grand, Gene Test Identifies Sporting Chance, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 22,
2004, at 3. The test is marketed by Genetic Technologies of Melbourne. Id.
38. In normal muscle repair, the microscopic tears in the muscle fiber produced by physical
exertion set off a chemical signal that triggers regeneration of the tissue by repairing the outer
membrane of the muscle fibers and adding new myofibrils to the interior. H. Lee Sweeney, Gene
Doping, SCI. AM., July 2004, 63, 64. This process is mediated by insulin-like growth factor-1
(IGF-1), which signals muscle-specific stem cells called satellite cells to proliferate via normal
cell division and fuse with the muscle fiber to add new nuclei to the cell, while another growthregulating factor, myostatin, signals them to stop. Id. at 64–66. Research has been conducted in
which a synthetic gene that produces IGF-1 in skeletal muscle has been introduced into the
skeletal muscle cells of mice using a virus as the vector and creating mice genetically engineered
to overproduce IGF-1 in skeletal muscle tissue. Id. at 66–67. The research has demonstrated that
such techniques result in muscles that grow larger and retain more regenerative capacity even as
the animal ages. Id. This enhanced muscle repair and growth ability was demonstrated even in
sedentary animals, indicating that gene therapy using IGF-1 can mimic the normal, exerciseinduced regenerative process. Id. It is also possible that gene therapy could be used to block
myostatin production, another mechanism by which muscle growth could be enhanced. Id. at 69.
39. The rationale for pharmacogenetics is that a significant amount of the variation in
individuals’ reactions to different drugs—why only some people suffer adverse reactions from
certain substances, for example, or why some therapeutic entities are effective only in some
people—is believed to be due to genetic differences. See Lars Noah, The Coming
Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’ Genetic Profiles, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 7 (2002). The idea is to conduct genetic testing on patients to discern these
differences and then tailor drug therapy based on the results. See id. On June 23, 2005, the FDA
approved the first drug to treat heart failure in a self-defined African-American population. Press
Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves BiDil Heart Failure Drug for Black
Patients (June 23, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01190.html. Yet
there is substantial controversy over whether African-Americans are genetically identifiable. See
Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093,
1116–17 (2004). For further insights into the ethical and legal issues raised by pharmacogenetics,
see Allen Buchanan et al., Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues and Policy Options, 12 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 1 (2002) and Noah, supra.
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II. ANTI-DOPING EFFORTS WITHIN SPORT
A.

History

Athletes have long sought competitive advantage by introducing
substances into their bodies. But it was not until the 1930s that the first signs
of a change in attitude towards doping in sport became apparent. At the time,
amphetamines were becoming increasingly popular among athletes and had
replaced strychnine as the performance enhancement of choice.40 In 1933, the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) first turned its attention to doping.
During a meeting of the Olympic Committee, Paul Rousseau, a member of the
French National Olympic Committee, delivered a statement to the IOC
claiming that doping was a violation of the spirit of the Olympics.41
Rousseau’s report was followed by an inquiry into doping, and in 1937, Lord
Burghley addressed the practices, methods, and effects of doping in the thirtyseventh session of the IOC in Moscow.42 The following year, the IOC
condemned doping.43
Concerns about doping were suspended during World War II, during
which new amphetamines were developed for and used by the military.44
Pioneering research also was conducted into the effects and chemical
structures of testosterone and other steroids.45 In 1948, the therapeutic effects
of cortisone were identified and there was a push for mass production.46 The
next decade was a highly productive one in steroid research, with the
development of prednisone and perdnisolone (both powerful antiinflammatories)47 and the commericial introduction of the first anabolicandrogenic steroid, Dianabol.48
Simultaneously, the medical establishment began to investigate the use of
amphetamines by competitive athletes. In 1957, The New York Times reported
that Olympic swimmers freely admitted to using “pep pills.”49 Following the

40. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 114.
41. Ruud Stokvis, Moral Entrepreneurship and Doping Cultures in Sport 6 (Amsterdam
School for Social Science Research, Working Paper No. 03/04, 2003), available at
http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/assr/frdocs/wp/downloads/ASSR-WP0304.pdf.
The International
Amateur Athletic Federation first banned doping in 1928. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra
note 12.
42. ALBERT DIRIX & XAVIER STURBOIS, THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MEDICAL COMMISSION 1967–1997, at 14 (1998).
43. Id.
44. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 115.
45. Heusler & Kalvoda, supra note 24, at 492.
46. Id. at 493.
47. Id.
48. HOBERMAN, supra note 25, at 266.
49. Athletes Report Use of ‘Pep Pills,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1957, at 20.
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Times report, the American College of Sports Medicine authorized its president
to appoint a committee to study amphetamine use among American athletes.50
Two years later, Henry Beecher (famous for his uncovering of ethical abuses in
human subjects research)51 published a study in the Journal of the American
Medical Association confirming that amphetamines did affect swimmers.52
Beecher found that athletes who were given doses of amphetamines before
attempting to beat their previous best performances were more successful that
those who did not take the pills.53
While amphetamines were becoming increasingly popular, there were also
indications that they were harmful. In 1960, the IOC focused its attention on
the use of amphetamine sulfates in pill form.54 During the Rome Olympics,
twenty-two-year-old Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen died of
amphetamine use.55 According to contemporary news reports, Jensen
collapsed from heatstroke approximately thirteen miles from the finish line of
the 100-kilometer (62.5-mile) team road race and died later at the hospital.56
Later it was revealed that Jensen and two teammates had taken large doses of
amphetamines to boost their performance.57 Subsequently, in 1962, the IOC
began discussions in earnest with the Federation Internationale MedicineSportive (FIMS), an organization of sports physicians, expressing concern that
the problem of doping was growing.58
Although attention was being drawn to amphetamine abuse by the early
1960s, anabolic steroids were not subject to similar scrutiny until much later.
Throughout the 1950s, there were rumors that the Soviets were experimenting
with testosterone as a way to improve athletic performance; these rumors were
not confirmed until the mid-1950s, at which point American team physician
Dr. John Ziegler obtained testosterone and began experimenting with it.59
Ziegler’s work and collaboration with the pharmaceutical company Ciba
resulted in the commercial introduction of Dianabol, the first steroid marketed
in the United States.60

50. Sport Physicians to Check on Pills, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1957, at 52.
51. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354
(1966).
52. Gene M. Smith & Henry K. Beecher, Amphetamine Sulfate and Athletic Performance,
170 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 542 (1959).
53. Id. at 557.
54. DIRIX & STURBOIS, supra note 42, at 14.
55. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12.
56. Dane in Rome Bike Race Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1960, at 13.
57. James C. Puffer, Drugs in Colleges: To Test or Not To Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1988,
§ 8 (Sports), at 7.
58. Stokvis, supra note 41, at 7.
59. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144.
60. HOBERMAN supra note 25, at 266.
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In the following years, doping generated considerable attention and
discussion, but relatively little action. In 1963, the Council of Europe set up a
commission on drugs and doping, but the committee was unable to agree on a
definition of doping.61 In 1965, another report on doping was delivered to the
IOC, but did not result in any definitive policy change.62 At the highest levels,
doping was condemned, but it was neither banned outright, nor were athletes
subjected to testing.63 However, France and Belgium introduced anti-doping
laws in the 1960s,64 and the international governing bodies of cycling (the
UCI) and soccer (FIFA) introduced testing for athletes in championship
competitions in 1966.65
The problem of doping, however, continued. In 1967, British cyclist Tom
Simpson died during the Tour de France,66 and his autopsy report included
positive tests for both amphetamine and methyl-amphetamine.67 Like Jenson,
Simpson collapsed on an incredibly hot day after hours of physical exertion,
and his official cause of death was listed as “heart failure caused by
exhaustion.”68 Simpson’s death was also notable because he had previously
acknowledged his drug use to the press, likening amphetamine use to a couple
of extra cups of coffee.69 Simpson and others also implied that stimulant use
was rampant among cyclists.70 French cyclist Jacques Anquetil claimed that
no one “used dope . . . but stimulants were another thing. Everybody had to be
hyped up to maintain the speeds demanded by the public.”71 In addition,
anabolic steroids were increasingly popular among athletes. By 1968, a third
of the American track and field team was reported to be using them.72
The IOC responded to Simpson’s death and public discussions of doping
by forming the Olympic Medical Commission in 1967.73 In 1968, it began
testing athletes for the first time, although it was not until 1976 that the first

61. Council of Europe, Europack: An Education and Information Guide on Sport Without
Doping, http://www.coe.int/T/E/cultural_co-operation/Sport/Doping/eEuropack.asp [hereinafter
Council of Europe] (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
62. Stokvis, supra note 41, at 8.
63. Council of Europe, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12.
66. John Hess, Simpson Dies in Tour de France, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1967, at 24
[hereinafter Hess, Simpson].
67. Drugs Discovered in Cyclist’s Autopsy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1967, at 26.
68. Id.
69. Hess, Simpson, supra note 66, at 24.
70. Id.; John L. Hess, Anti-Doping Rules Threatening Anquetil’s Bicycle Speed Mark, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1967, at 62 [hereinafter Hess, Anti-Doping].
71. Hess, Anti-Doping, supra note 70, at 62.
72. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 145.
73. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12.
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tests for anabolic steroids were conducted,74 almost twenty years after they
first became commercially available in the United States.75 Though the IOC
publicly condemned doping, it was largely powerless to stop the use of
performance enhancing drugs. The IOC’s first banned drugs list contained
only two categories, stimulants and narcotic analgesics, because these were the
only questionable substances that could be detected by existing testing.76 In
1983, testosterone was added, followed by diuretics, beta-blockers, and blood
doping in 1985.77 As the IOC struggled to keep up with doping methods, it
also had to keep track of masking methods. In 1985, the IOC banned the
manipulation of urine samples and added Probencid and other masking agents
to the prohibited list two years later.78 It also started blood tests in 1988 for
some athletes and continued adding substances to the list, including human
chorionic gonadotropin (used to reverse the testicular shrinking that sometimes
accompanies anabolic steroid use) in 1987, and HGH and peptide hormones in
1989.79
While the IOC’s list of banned substances and methods continued to grow
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, it was still unsuccessful at catching
dopers. At the Moscow Games in 1980, no Olympic athlete tested positive,80
even though the East Germans were systematically doping their athletes.81
Between 1976 and 1994, no more than a dozen athletes tested positive for
performance enhancers in any given Olympics, and in several Olympics there
were no positive tests at all.82 Despite the high-profile disqualification of gold
medalist Ben Johnson at the Seoul Olympics in 1988,83 doping control made
very little headway in effectively banning performance enhancing drugs, and
the perception remained that the IOC was neither catching dopers nor
punishing those who were implicated.84
The IOC was vocal about its anti-doping efforts, but it often seemed that
its rhetoric was just talk. This was particularly apparent when Chinese
74. JOHN HOBERMAN, TESTOSTERONE DREAMS: REJUVENATION, APHRODISIA, DOPING 243
(2005).
75. See HOBERMAN supra note 25, at 266.
76. Verroken, supra note 14, at 23.
77. Id. at 23–24.
78. Id. at 24–25.
79. Id.
80. Michele Verroken & David R. Mottram, Doping Control in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT
235, 237 (David R. Mottram ed., 2d ed. 1996).
81. Associated Press, Swimming: Olympian Tells of Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998,
at C5.
82. Verroken & Mottram, supra note 80, at 237.
83. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States’ and International Response to
the Problem of Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461, 467
(2002).
84. See id. at 481.
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swimmers were accused of doping in the early 1990s.85 Despite repeated calls
for investigations, the IOC and FINA (the international governing body of
swimming) refused to admit a problem existed.86 FINA also declined to
enforce its own anti-doping rules against the Chinese.87 When swimmer Yuan
Yuan was found with thirteen vials of HGH at the World Championships in
Perth, Australia, she was the only athlete disciplined, despite the fact that she
was carrying enough HGH for the entire team.88 The scandal was further
exacerbated when China nominated Juan Samaranch, president of the IOC, for
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, which some alleged was meant to curry favor to
avoid sanctions.89 In 1998, a doping scandal rocked the Tour de France, when
the entire Festina team was disqualified,90 seven teams were implicated in
doping, and dozens of athletes tested positive for EPO.91 In 2000, Andreea
Raducan, a Romanian gymnast, was stripped of her gold medal at the Sydney
Olympics following a positive drug test for pseudoephedrine (a stimulant
commonly found in cold medicine).92 Rumors also abounded that American
track and field athletes were actively involved in doping and the BALCO
scandal.93 Shot-putter C.J. Hunter resigned from the sport following four
positive drug tests in 2000.94 With mounting political pressure to confront the
problem of doping, the IOC made the decision to remove itself from drug
testing, and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was formed on
November 10, 1999.95 WADA was created to be an independent oversight
agency, but the IOC still exercises considerable control over it and holds
sixteen spots on the thirty-five-person board.96 The agency was created with a
list of express objectives: “Promote and coordinate the fight against doping[;]
[r]einforce the ethical basis for anti-doping and protect the health of athletes[;]
[e]stablish and maintain a list of prohibited substances[;] [c]oordinate no
notice, out-of-competition testing[;] [d]evelop analytical standards[;] [p]romote
85. See David Galluzzi, The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition: Lessons
from the Chinese Doping Scandal in Women’s Swimming, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 65, 77–90
(2000), for a full explanation of the Chinese doping scandal in women’s swimming.
86. Id. at 78–90.
87. Id. at 80–81.
88. Id. at 84.
89. Id. at 97–98.
90. John T. Wendt, WADA, Doping and THG, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 28.
91. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 467.
92. Id.
93. See Jere Longman, Anti-Doping Agency Enters a Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004,
at D1.
94. Associated Press, Track and Field: C.J. Hunter Reassigned at North Carolina State,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, at D5.
95. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 480–81.
96. Steve Keating, IOC Unveils Clean-up Campaign, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 11,
1999, at 27.
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harmonized sanctions[;] [d]evelop education programs[;] [p]romote and
coordinate peer-reviewed research.”97 Since its inception, WADA has
developed a variety of long-term planning initiatives, including its Strategic
Plan for 2004–2009, addressing a World Doping Code, education, research,
and improving WADA’s testing and enforcement capacity.98 With funding
from the IOC and national anti-doping agencies, WADA certifies laboratories,
oversees and conducts drug testing, funds doping research, and undertakes
significant outreach and education projects.99
B.

Rationales for Banning Doping

Success in sports is the product of many ingredients. Among them are
good equipment; proper coaching; hard work; a financially and emotionally
supportive environment, including one’s family; psychological traits, such as
mental focus and a drive to win; the right physical constitution, including the
ability to absorb punishment; and good medical care for illness and injury. Yet
organized sports deem one potential ingredient—doping—to lie beyond the
pale of acceptability. The question is why.
At the outset, it is important to note that this is not the same question as
asking whether athletes who are caught using banned substances deserve to be
punished. Morally, these athletes are no different from baseball players who
“cork” their bats100 or marathon runners who begin their races by slipping onto
the course near the finish line.101 Disagreements may arise concerning which
substances should be banned,102 how infractions should be detected (for
example, whether to conduct drug testing only during competition),103 and
97. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 482 (citations omitted).
98. World Anti-Doping Agency, Strategic Plan, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?
pageCategory.id=257 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
99. World Anti-Doping Agency, Science and Research, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/
dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=249 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
100. In June 2003, Chicago Cubs slugger Sammy Sosa was ejected from the game when a 50cent-piece-sized chunk of cork was discovered in his bat after it split. Unsplendid Splinter: Cubs
Rally Past Rays After Sosa’s Ignominious Ejection, SI.COM, June 3, 2003,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2003/06/03/sosa_ejected_ap/.
The object of
corking is to lighten the bat, making it easier to swing. See Peter Gammons, Criticism of Sosa
Way Off Base, ESPN.COM, June 6, 2003, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/gammons/
story?id=1564438.
101. On April 21, 1980, a woman named Rosie Ruiz was the first woman to finish the Boston
Marathon. Kevin Paul Dupont, Rosie Ruiz: From Kenmore Square to West Palm Beach, Fla., It’s
Been Mystery, BOSTON GLOBE, April 14, 1996, at 69. Later it was determined that she had
started the race about a mile from the finish line. Id.
102. See discussion infra accompanying notes 144–153 concerning appropriateness of
banning relatively harmless substances.
103. See Jere Longman, U.S. Swim Coach Calls for Increase of Random Testing, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2000, at D6 (discussing call by U.S. women’s Olympic swim coach for more frequent
out-of-competition drug testing of his athletes and allegations that the world swimming governing
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whether alleged wrongdoers are afforded proper procedural protections.104
Once the rules are adopted, however, competitors have no morally defensible
option except to abide by them or refrain from engaging in the sport. The
question here is different. Assuming that drugs are against the rules, what we
are trying to find out is why.
1.

Safety

One of the reasons originally set forth by the Olympic Medical
Commission for banning doping was “[p]rotecting the athletes’ health.”105
Listening to opponents of doping, one would think that the substances used by
athletes to improve performance were extremely dangerous, if not lethal. In
regard to steroids, for example, the National Institute on Drug Abuse states:
The major side effects from abusing anabolic steroids can include liver tumors
and cancer, jaundice (yellowish pigmentation of skin, tissues, and body fluids),
fluid retention, high blood pressure, increases in LDL (bad cholesterol), and
decreases in HDL (good cholesterol). Other side effects include kidney tumors,
severe acne, and trembling.106

NIDA describes a number of additional gender-specific side effects:
For men—shrinking of the testicles, reduced sperm count, infertility, baldness,
development of breasts, increased risk for prostate cancer.

body fails to devote enough resources to random testing); Dick Patrick, Olympic-Style Drug
Testing is Rigid, USA TODAY, July 8, 2002, at 8C (contrasting Major League Baseball’s lack of
random drug testing to the random testing of the Olympics); Thorpe Urges More Drug Testing,
ABC ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200408/s1173477.htm
(discussing Australian Olympic swimmer Ian Thorpe’s call for more out-of-competition drug
testing of athletes).
104. See Jere Longman, Jones’s Lawyers Challenge Evidence Against Her, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2004, at D1 (discussing the attempts by Marion Jones’ lawyers to discount documentary
evidence of her steroid use on the grounds that it did not prove her guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); Jere Longman & Liz Robbins, Sprinter Barred from Olympics As U.S. Doping Scandal
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1 (discussing the suspension of U.S. sprinter Kelli White
from Olympic competition based on documents obtained in the BALCO lab investigation rather
than a positive drug test, and discussing athletes’ legal challenges to attempts to suspend them
without positive drug test results); Dick Patrick, Jones’ Attorney: Drug Agency Has No
Compelling Evidence, USA TODAY, May 25, 2004, at 1A (discussing objections by attorney for
Olympic track gold medalist Marion Jones that the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency improperly
sanctioned her for doping without an admission of drug use or a positive urine sample).
105. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MEDICAL: THE FIGHT AGAINST DOPING &
PROMOTION OF ATHLETES’ HEALTH, July 2004, at 1, http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/
en_report_838.pdf.
106. Steroids (Anabolic-Andgrogenic), NIDA INFO FACTS, (National Institute on Drug
Abuse), March 2005, at 1, http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/Infofacts/Steroids05.pdf [hereinafter
NIDA].
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For women—growth of facial hair, male-pattern baldness, changes in or
cessation of the menstrual cycle, enlargement of the clitoris, deepened voice.
For adolescents—growth halted prematurely through premature skeletal
maturation and accelerated puberty changes. This means that adolescents risk
remaining short for the remainder of their lives if they take anabolic steroids
before the typical adolescent growth spurt.107

NIDA also mentions risks of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis from injections,
aggression, psychiatric side effects, such as mood swings, depression, paranoid
jealousy, extreme irritability, delusions, impaired judgment, and dependency
on heroin to counteract insomnia and irritability.108
These assessments have been reinforced in Congressional hearings on
steroids. Senator Jim Bunning (R-Ky.), a former baseball player, testified:
So it’s important for the American public to understand just how harmful
steroids can be to someone’s health. Side effects of steroid use include fatal
conditions like liver cysts, liver cancer, blood clotting, hypertension and can
even lead to heart attack and stroke and many other bad things. Baseball has
helped to open a Pandora’s box and now there’s a chance to fix that damage
and educate the public on the terrible health effects of steroids.109

Parents described how their sons had committed suicide on account of steroids:
20 short months ago, our youngest son, Taylor, took his own life. He was 2
weeks away from beginning his senior year in high school . . . .
. . . I am absolutely convinced that Taylor’s secret use of anabolic steroids
played a significant role in causing the depression, the severe depression that
resulted in his suicide. And I have also learned that the events leading up to
and including Taylor’s suicide are right out of the medical textbook on
steroids.110

Olympic gold medalist Carl Lewis testified:
We have heard many stories. One that I can focus on, just recently, I believe,
was a West German female athlete who at one point had taken up to 40
steroids, different types of steroids and different types of drugs. She had so
much scar tissue and such a reaction in her hip, her buttocks and her hip area,
that they couldn’t even get needles in her skin. They were breaking off in her
skin. She ultimately died from steroid use. So we are talking about someone
who went completely crazy, taking injections, injections, injections, one after
another. That area was as hard as a rock. They couldn’t even put a needle in
it.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 1–2.
109. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 56 (statement of Sen. Jim
Bunning).
110. Id. at 118 (testimony of Donald M. Hooton).
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Athletes have died.111
Still, the truth regarding the health risks associated with doping is less
clear. Many of the adverse health effects attributed to steroids stem from oral
use of a class of compounds known as the 17-α-alkylated steroids.112 These
compounds indeed can cause elevations in liver enzymes and an increased risk
of liver cancer.113 But these effects are due to the fact that orally ingested
compounds are broken down in the liver. The same results are not true of
injected steroid compounds.114 Some studies have suggested that anabolic
steroids raise blood pressure, but the effects were transitory.115 One study
found that steroids produced changes in echocardiograms,116 and another saw
changes that could indicate a predisposition to arrhythmias, which can produce
sudden death.117 Studies also report a decrease in high density lipoproteins
(“good” cholesterol) and an increase in low density lipoproteins (“bad”
cholesterol), but this is mainly the case with oral steroids and the levels return
to normal once steroid use is discontinued.118 Moreover, some research shows
that anabolic steroids beneficially increase lipoprotein-a (LPa), which
promotes cardiovascular health.119
Steroids are hormones, and the steroids that build muscles are versions of
the male hormone, testosterone. As a consequence, they are both anabolic—
i.e., muscle-building—and androgenic—that is, they produce masculine
physical characteristics. Over the years, efforts have been made to isolate the
anabolic from the androgenic effects, but without success.120 As a result,
anabolic steroids in women produce acne, voice deepening, hair loss, breast
reduction, and enlargement of the clitoris.121 In males, anabolic steroids
suppress the natural production of hormones. This can cause testicular
111. Anabolic Steroid Restriction Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 995 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101th Cong. 24 (1989) (statement of Carl Lewis).
112. See Fred Hartgens & Harm Kuipers, Effects of Androgenic-Anabolic Steroids in Athletes,
34 SPORTS MED. 513, 516, 540 (2004) (discussing the hepetatic effects caused by the slower
degradation of orally active compounds by the liver). The term “17-α-alkylated steroid” refers to
the chemical structure of a particular class of steroids that are administered orally rather than
injected. See id. at 516. Anabolic steroids come in a variety of forms, including the alkylated
oral agents and several injectable compounds, both oil- and water-based. See TAYLOR, supra
note 24, at 36.
113. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 540–41; Eric C. Kutscher et al., Anabolic
Steroids: A Review for the Clinician, 32 SPORTS MED. 285, 290 (2002).
114. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 540.
115. Id. at 539–40.
116. See id.
117. Anu Stolt et al., QT Interval and QT Dispersion in Endurance Athletes and in Power
Athletes Using Large Doses of Anabolic Steroids, 84 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 364, 366 (1999).
118. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 537–38.
119. Id. at 538.
120. See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 16–17.
121. Kutscher et al., supra note 113, at 292.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

30

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:15

atrophy, decreased sperm production, sperm irregularities, and gynaecomastia
(male breast development).122 The effects in males are usually reversible once
steroid use is discontinued; in females, the changes may be harder to
reverse.123 In terms of psychiatric effects, the evidence is equivocal. Some
studies report effects on mood and aggression; others do not.124
Researchers have attempted to study mortality among steroid users. An
oft-cited experiment in mice found that adult males given anabolic steroids for
six months at doses comparable to those taken by bodybuilders had a 4.3
percent increase in mortality and that a year after exposure 52 percent of them
had died compared with only 12 percent of the controls.125 Another study
found that power lifters had a mortality rate of 12.9 percent over 12 years
compared with 3.1 percent of the general population, but this study did not
confirm that the subjects had used steroids, did not measure the amount, if any,
and did not control for other substances and behaviors.126
What is most striking about all of this research is that virtually none of it is
definitive. There are no long-term, double-blind, randomized, placebocontrolled investigations of steroid use by athletes. Much of the data,
including anecdotal reports, or observational studies in which the subjects’ use
of steroids, as well as other potentially dangerous substances that would
confound the results, is unconfirmed and unmeasured. This has led some
researchers to conclude that the health hazards of steroids have been
overstated, that serious health effects are rare, and that the most common side

122. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 535–536.
123. Kutscher et al., supra note 113, at 292.
124. Compare Ann S. Clark & Leslie P. Henderson, Behavioral and Physiological Responses
to Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids, 27 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 413, 415 (2003)
(describing aggression in animals given anabolic steroids), and Harrison G. Pope et al., Effects of
Supraphysiological Doses of Testosterone on Mood and Aggression in Normal Men, 57
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2000) (concluding testosterone cyprionate in doses of up
to 600 mg. per week significantly increased incidence of manic behavioral symptoms), with
Shalender Bhasin et al., The Effects of Supraphysiologic Doses of Testosterone on Muscle Size
and Strength in Normal Men, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 6 (1996) (concluding testosterone
enanthate doses of 600 mg. per week produced no increased incidence of angry behavior
compared to controls), Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 542 (noting some studies report
lower aggression among body-builders presumed to use anabolic steroids), and Kutscher et al.,
supra note 113, at 293 (describing mixed reports on the relationship between anabolic steroids
and psychiatric effects).
125. Franklin H. Bronson & Curt M. Matherne, Exposure to Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids
Shortens Life Span of Male Mice, 29 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 615, 615 (1997). The
one-year mortality effect was dose-related; 35 percent of mice receiving a low dose of steroids
died compared with 12 percent of controls. Id.
126. M. Parssinen et al., Increased Premature Mortality of Competitive Powerlifters
Suspected to Have Used Anabolic Agents, 21 INT’L J. SPORTS MED. 225, 225–226 (2000).
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effects are reversible and benign.127 Others conclude that the only adverse
effects firmly supported by experimental data are potentially unfavorable
effects in blood lipid profiles and an increased risk for mood changes and
aggression.128 In fact, only one reported study actually administered injected
high doses of anabolic steroids (600 mg. per week of testosterone enanthate) to
human subjects and compared the effects with a control group. The
investigators found that steroids significantly increased muscle size and
strength and produced no adverse effects; however, the treatment period lasted
only ten weeks.129
Of course, the lack of definitive data on long-term anabolic steroid use
does not mean that steroids are safe for athletes. There are some disturbing
indications in the literature.
Even lawfully manufactured compounds
administered under a doctor’s supervision may entail some health risks. More
importantly, athletes may be using illicit preparations with uncertain identity,
strength, and purity, and at extremely high and widely varying dosages.130
Athletes also continue to use both oral and injectable steroids, potentially
exposing them to the greater potential for liver toxicity associated with the oral
compounds.
Yet an enormous number of persons are reported to be using steroids. One
account puts the number of U.S. athletes using steroids at between one and
three million.131 A noted expert on steroid use found that 29.3 percent of
college football players and 20 percent of college track-and-field athletes
admitted using the substance.132 Thirty-three percent of elite power athletes
and competitive bodybuilders interviewed by questionnaire and 55 percent
interviewed by phone admitted to steroid use.133 The National Institute of
Drug Abuse claimed in 1999 that half-a-million eighth and tenth graders were
using steroids.134 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
127. Nick A. Evans, Current Concepts in Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids, 32 AM. J. SPORTS
MED. 534, 537 (2004).
128. Ingemar Thiblin & Anna Petersson, Pharmacoepidemiology of Anabolic Androgenic
Steroids: A Review, 19 FUNDAMENTAL & CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 27, 40 (2004).
129. Bhasin et al., supra note 124, at 2, 5–6.
130. See NIDA, supra note 106, at 1.
131. Tokish et al., supra note 22, at 1544.
132. C.E. Yesalis et al., Athletes’ Projections of Anabolic Steroid Use, 2 CLINICAL SPORTS
MED. 155, 160 (1990).
133. Charles E. Yesalis et al., Self-Reported Use of Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids by Elite
Power Lifters, 16 PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMED. 91, 93 (1988); see also Ray Tricker et al., The
Incidence of Anabolic Steroid Use Among Competitive Bodybuilders, 19 J. DRUG EDUC. 313, 321
(1989) (finding 54 percent of male body builders to have been regular steroid users).
134. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3866 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8
(2004) [hereinafter Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004 Hearing] (statement of Joseph
Rannazzisi, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration).
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estimates that one million adolescents have used or are using steroids.135 Girls
are reported to be using steroids, not just to enhance athletic performance, but
also “to get the toned, sculpted look of models and movie stars.”136 During a
1999 hearing, one congressman testified: “[W]e are seeing a public health
crisis with respect to these drugs in American youths. It seems that now the
same number of kids using some kind of steroid, is the number that are using
cocaine.”137
Moreover, athletes are subject to frequent and thorough medical
examinations. All but one state high school athletic association, and 97
percent of colleges and universities, require prospective athletes to undergo a
preparticipation physical examination (PPE).138 Fifty-one percent of colleges
and universities require annual PPEs.139 PPEs also are standard for
professional players.140 Although laboratory tests are not routine for the PPE,
the examinations include an extensive medical history (with specific questions
designed to screen for susceptibility to common athletic health risks) and a
physical examination.141 Given how rampant anabolic steroid use is believed
to be, and how long many athletes have been using steroids, one would expect
to see far more frequent reports of serious health problems among athletes if
steroids were as hazardous as NIDA and others make them out to be.
Not only may the dangers of steroids be exaggerated, but there are other
factors that undermine the persuasiveness of the safety rationale. In the first
place, society already tolerates a substantial amount of danger in sports. It is
estimated that from July 2000 to June 2001, 4.3 million people visited hospital

135. NFL Hearing, supra note 8, at 47 (testimony of Linn Goldberg, M.D.).
136. Associated Press, Girls Are Abusing Steroids Too—Often to Get That Toned Look,
USATODAY.COM, April 26, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-04-25-girlssteroids_x.htm.
137. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic
Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 106th Cong. 4 (1999)
[hereinafter Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs] (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden).
138. David W. Glover et al., The Preparticipation Physical Examination: Steps Toward
Consensus and Uniformity, 27 PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMED. 29, 30 (1999) (discussing high school
athletic association physical examination requirements); James M. Lyznicki et al.,
Cardiovascular Screening of Student Athletes, 62 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 765, 773 (2000),
available at http://www.aafp.org/afp/20000815/765.html (discussing physical examination
requirements as colleges and universities). Guidelines of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association require that athletes undergo a PPE.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 2005–2006, at 6 (2005).
139. Lyznicki et al., supra note 138, at 773.
140. Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary,
and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 13 (2002).
141. See Kurt Kurowski & Sangili Chandran, The Preparticipation Athletic Evaluation, 61
AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2683, 2683 (2000), available at http://www.aafp.org/afp/20000501/
2683.html.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

DOPING IN SPORTS AND THE USE OF STATE POWER

33

emergency rooms for nonfatal, sports- and recreation-related injuries.142 In
males, basketball, bicycle, and football injuries were the most frequent.143 If
people really wanted athletes to be safe, they would either eliminate dangerous
sports or change the rules, like prohibiting the use of rigid hockey sticks and
requiring professional boxers to wear much more protective helmets or much
more highly-cushioned gloves. True, changing the rules in this way could alter
the fundamental nature of the sports. But the fact that we allow these sports to
be fundamentally dangerous shows that we are not fundamentally interested in
safety. More importantly, it begs the question of why the risks of being injured
playing the sport are deemed acceptable but the risks from enhancements are
not.
The most telling argument against the safety rationale against doping,
however, is that sports prohibit even the use of safe drugs. Andreea Raducan,
a Romanian gymnast, was stripped of her gold medal at the 2002 Olympics
because she took two over-the-counter cold pills.144 For many years, the
Olympics banned caffeine in concentrations in excess of twelve micrograms
per milliliter of urine.145 A 150-pound person would need to ingest about 600
milligrams of caffeine to exceed the twelve microgram level.146 This is the

142. Nonfatal Sports- and Recreation-Related Injuries Treated in Emergency Departments—
United States, July 2000–June 2001, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention), Aug. 23, 2002, at 737 [hereinafter CDC REPORT].
143. Id. at 739. In females, the most frequent injuries occurred in bicycle, basketball, and
playground sports. Id.
144. Dick Patrick, Drugs Taint Games, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2000, at 1A (reporting that
Raducan took two tablets of a cold medication that contained pseudoephedrine). This is the same
ingredient and strength sold over-the-counter in the United States as Sudafed. See Pfizer,
Sudafed Nasal Decongestant Tablets, http://www.pfizerch.com/product.aspx?id=512 (last visited
Jan. 9, 2006). In 2004, WADA removed pseudoephedrine from the list of substances banned in
the Olympics and placed it in its Monitoring Program, meaning that athletes will continue to be
tested for the substance so that WADA can monitor patterns of use and restore the substance to
the banned list if warranted. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE 2005 MONITORING PROGRAM
(2005), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Monitoring_Program_
2005.pdf [hereinafter WADA MONITORING LIST]. Pseudoephedrine is under scrutiny in the
United States because it is used to manufacture methamphetamine. Support Grows for Law
Restricting Sale of Cold Medicines, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2005, at 10. A number of states have
passed laws requiring pharmacies to place over-the-counter drugs containing the ingredient
behind the pharmacy counter and limiting the number of pills that an individual may purchase.
Id.
145. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE BOARD, OLYMPIC MOVEMENT
ANTI-DOPING CODE APPENDIX A, § I.A.a. (2003), available at http://www.medycyna
sportowa.pl/download/doping_code_e.pdf. WADA placed caffeine on its 2005 Monitoring
Program. WADA MONITORING LIST, supra note 144. For a description of this program, see
supra note 144.
146. See Mark S. Juhn, Popular Sports Supplements and Ergogenic Aids, 33 SPORTS MED.
921, 925 (2003).
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equivalent of one sixteen-ounce cup of Starbucks coffee plus a couple of
Mountain Dews.147
In short, protecting athletes’ health is not an adequate explanation for the
war against doping. Any doubt about this has been dispelled by WADA itself.
In 2003, WADA replaced the three rationales originally given by the Olympic
Medical Commission for banning doping148 with three criteria for determining
when a substance should be banned: (1) “[i]t is performance-enhancing,” (2)
“[i]t represents a risk to the health of the athlete,” and (3) “[i]t is against the
spirit of sport.”149 Significantly, WADA declared that only two of the three
criteria needed to be satisfied in order for a substance to be banned.150
Consequently, even substances that do not represent a risk to athletes’ health
can be banned so long as they enhance performance and are “against the spirit
of sport.”
Just because safety is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor to explain
the war on doping does not make it irrelevant, however. Although the health
risks from steroids and other performance-enhancing substances may be
exaggerated, they nevertheless may be substantial, especially if athletes use
underground preparations of uncertain identity, strength, and purity, at
uncontrolled dosages, without proper medical supervision, over extended
periods of time.151 Although there seems to be a striking dearth of documented
147. See Barbara F. Harland, Caffeine and Nutrition, 16 NUTRITION 522, 523, 524 (2000).
The safety of caffeine is well-established. See Terry E. Graham, Caffeine and Exercise:
Metabolism, Endurance and Performance, 31 SPORTS MED. 785, 804 (2001); Juhn, supra note
146, at 925–26.
148. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1.
149. In-Depth: Prohibited List, ATHLETE’S PASSPORT (World Anti-Doping Agency), Apr.
2004, at 2, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/April_04.pdf.
150. Id.
151. The main adverse effects associated with HGH injections are insulin resistance, glucose
intolerance, decreased endogenous HGH secretion, carpal tunnel syndrome, water retention, and
potential cardiovascular effects. Juhn, supra note 146, at 931; Paul J. Jenkins, Growth Hormone
and Exercise, 50 CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 683, 686 (1999). These risks are mainly
extrapolated from observations of patients with acromegaly, characterized by excessive
endogenous production of growth hormone (GH) of up to 100 times the normal amount, due to
pituitary dysfunction. Jenkins, supra, at 686. Little is known about the adverse effects of the
long-term use of HGH by athletes. Christer Ehrnborg et al., Growth Hormone Abuse, 14
BAILLIERE’S CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 71, 74 (2000). The usual dose for
adult GH-deficient patients is 1–2 IU/day. Id. at 73. Athletes have been reported to use
supraphysiological dosages as high as 10–25 IU/day, but the mean dose appears to be around 4
IU/day. Id. Presently, the most common adverse effects noted among these users are excessive
sweating and fluid retention. Id. at 74–75; see also Karel Van Loon, Safety of High Doses of
Recombinant Human Growth Hormone, 49 HORMONE RES. 78, 80–81 (1998). Another concern
is the use of oral dietary supplements and black market products purporting to be HGH or “HGH
precursors.” See Juhn, supra note 146, at 930–31. These may contain dangerous ingredients, and
products that actually contain HGH may be contaminated with agents that can cause
Creutzfeld-Jacob or other diseases. Id. at 931. Excessive amounts of EPO can raise hemoglobin
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reports of steroid toxicity in modern athletes, it is conceivable that long-term,
high-dose use could produce latent adverse effects that would not become
apparent until many years had passed. Moreover, it is a truism of
pharmacology that no drug is completely safe. Even fairly benign substances
like caffeine can be lethal if ingested in sufficient quantities,152 and even
modest risks may not be worth taking. In short, drug safety is a relative
concept: a drug is safe if its risks are outweighed by its benefits.153
Some would say that, in the case of performance-enhancing drugs in
sports, the outcome of this risk/benefit analysis is clear: the risks never can be
outweighed by the benefits simply because there are no benefits, or at least, no
socially accepted benefits. Obviously, this would be true if doping were
against the rules; there can be no socially recognized benefit from breaking the
rules, any more than there can be from a substance that makes it easier to
commit crimes, assuming that it accomplished nothing else of social value.
But this Article does not assume that doping is against the rules; instead, it asks
whether it should be. Could doping provide any benefit, assuming it was not
against the rules? Or, to put it another way, why might a sport allow athletes
to use performance-enhancing drugs?
a.

Better Playing

One reason athletes might be permitted to use performance-enhancing
drugs would be to help them play better: runners could run faster or longer
distances, shooters and archers could hit more bulls-eyes, weightlifters could
snatch greater weights, and so on. Allowing players to play better clearly is a
legitimate goal of sports, as it is the fundamental reason for coaching, training,
and practice.154 Moreover, it is clear that better technology is one legitimate

levels to the point that the blood actually thickens dangerously, especially during exercise, when
sweating decreases blood viscosity. W. Jelkmann, Use of Recombinant Human Erythropoietin As
an Antianemic and Performance Enhancing Drug, 1 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECH. 11,
24 (2000). This condition can increase the risk of heart problems and blood clots. Tokish et al.,
supra note 22, at 1548. EPO is suspected in the deaths of five Dutch cyclists in 1987 and of
eighteen other cyclists between 1997 and 2000. Id.
152. The acute lethal oral dose of caffeine for adults is estimated to be between five and ten
grams, depending on the individual. Juan A. Carrillo & Julio Benitez, Clinically Significant
Pharmacokinetic Interactions Between Dietary Caffeine and Medications, 39 CLINICAL
PHARMACOKINETICS 127, 133 (2000). Achieving this dose would require consuming 50–100
cups of coffee per day, assuming a cup of coffee contained 100 milligrams of caffeine. Id.
Although death from excessive caffeine intake is rare, it has occurred after suicidal or accidental
ingestion of large amounts of caffeine. Id.
153. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, BENEFIT VS. RISK: HOW CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS 1, http://www.fda.gov/
cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-5.pdf.
154. Opponents of doping might assert that coaching, training, and practice allow athletes to
make the most of their natural talents, while drugs give them unnatural abilities. But the fact that
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way to enable players to play better. Hence, there has been increased interest
in high-tech sports training equipment and sports psychology,155 not to mention
in the development of better equipment, such as fiberglass pole-vault poles,
super-sized tennis racquets, and TechZilla softball bats.156 Nor is there
anything illegitimate about the fact that, unlike training and equipment, drugs
are taken internally. So is food, and yet an important part of an athlete’s
preparation is proper diet, often regulated by experts in accordance with stateof-the-art nutritional science. Indeed, one of the classic ways to enhance
athletic performance is “carbohydrate loading,” in which the athlete consumes

a talent is “natural” does not give it any superior moral status, because athletes have done nothing
to deserve their natural talents. Oddly, it seems to be precisely the absence of merit that makes
philosopher Michael Sandel revere natural talent, which he calls “the gifted character of human
powers and achievements.” Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with
Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April
2004, at 51, 54. Furthermore, performance-enhancing drugs may be used to supplement rather
than replace natural talents. Doping opponents also might claim that athletes who gained an
advantage from drugs, even though they might be able to run faster, jump farther, and so on,
were, by definition, not playing “better.” But if drugs enable athletes to do these things, then in
what sense can the athletes not be said to be performing “better”? One possibility is that they
have not earned the improvement in performance, as they would have if it resulted, for example,
from harder training. But many of the ingredients of an athlete’s performance are unearned,
including, as stated above, natural talent. Critics of doping may have in mind a notion similar to
Peter Kramer’s argument in Listening to Prozac that anti-depressants make you feel different, but
not better. See PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC xix (1993). But either this is
tautological (greater speed caused by drugs is, by definition, not greater speed), or, as explained
below, it is an expression of aesthetic value which says nothing more than that doping opponents
find drugs unappealing. See discussion infra Part II.B.7.
155. See B. Donohue et al., Improving Athletes’ Perspectives of Sport Psychology
Consultation, 28 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 182 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of interview
methods); Daniel S. Kirschenbaum et al., Effects of Differential Self-Monitoring and Level of
Mastery on Sports Performance: Brain Power Bowling, 6 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 335
(1982) (assessing the effectiveness of methods on improving bowling scores); Joannie M. Schrof
et al., The Winning Edge: The High-Tech Gizmos, Training Wizardry, and Special Diets That
Propel Olympians to Glory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29, 1996, at 38 (describing new
Olympic imaging and performance-analyzing equipment).
156. Pole vault poles originally were made of bamboo, but the game switched to fiberglass
poles in the early 1960s, resulting in significantly higher vaults. John Jerome, Physics at the Bar,
5 SCIENCE 84, 85 (1984). Oversized tennis racquets were introduced in the 1970s and have a
playing surface that is about 50 percent larger than traditional racquets. Tom Herman,
Navratilova Notwithstanding, Rage in Tennis Game Is a Bigger Racquet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26,
1980, at 35. Some expert players think that the larger racquets are more powerful, provide a
greater margin of error, give players a longer reach, and are more intimidating. Id. TechZilla
bats have twin, multi-braced aluminum walls to enable slow-pitch softball batters to hit balls
farther distances. Brendan I. Koerner, Ready for Hardball Softball, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, §
3 (Business), at 2.
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a large amount of carbohydrates before competition.157 The question is why
sports refuse to allow athletes to take drugs to improve performance when they
permit them to do all these other things.
b.

Leveling the Playing Field

A second reason sports might permit athletes to use performanceenhancing drugs might be to help level the uneven playing field created by
differences in natural talent or luck. Often, these differences, rather than the
athletes’ effort or determination, dictate who succeeds. Yet athletes have done
nothing to merit these advantages, and therefore do not deserve to benefit from
them.158 This is why many sports segregate competitors into classes based on
157. Carbohydrate loading is a technique commonly used by endurance athletes to improve
performance during high intensity exercise lasting longer than sixty to ninety minutes. CarboLoading: Boost your Endurance During High-Intensity Workouts, CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/library/HQ/00385.html. It works by increasing the amount of
glycogen stored in the muscles. Id. When carbohydrates are digested, they are converted into
sugar to provide energy to the cells. Id. Excess sugar not used by the cells is stored in the liver
and muscles as glycogen. Id. Normally, the body stores only small amounts of glycogen, which
are depleted after sixty to ninety minutes of exercise, causing fatigue. Id. Before a major
endurance event, athletes will taper the amount of exercise to conserve glycogen stores while at
the same time increasing carbohydrate consumption to force the body to store more glycogen,
thus boosting endurance during extended high intensity exercise. Id. It is a very common
practice among distance runners and other endurance athletes, as it tends to be most effective with
extended periods of high-intensity exercise. Id.
158. This is not the same as saying that the advantages conferred by natural talent or luck are
unfair, however. One of the possible reasons that sports, not to mention society in general, allow
people to profit from that which they have done nothing to deserve is that the distribution of
talent and luck is presumed to be random (except by those who believe that they are gifts from
God). Since in theory anyone could have been born with natural talent or be lucky, it is not unfair
to let these factors be ingredients for success.
The notion that random distribution is fair is ingrained in American jurisprudence and
ethics. In an early case addressing how to select which persons to jettison from an overcrowded
lifeboat, the court recommended drawing lots, stating: “[W]e can conceive of no mode so
consonant both to humanity and to justice.” U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1842).
Courts also have approved lotteries as a constitutionally permissible method for allocating scarce
public housing and liquor licenses. Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir.
1968) (housing); Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor licenses). The
possibility of random reward arguably is a major factor in sustaining religious superstition and in
maintaining sharp inequalities of wealth; people believe that random rewards come from God,
and the poor view state lotteries as “the only possibility for breaking out of the cycle of poverty.”
Ronald P. Keeven, Pros and Cons of Gambling Amendment: Money Used for Legalized Betting
Drains Resources of the Poor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 1994, at 3B.
As it happens, obtaining natural talent from one’s genes is not completely random:
athletes’ children are more athletically gifted than other children, especially when both parents
are athletic. See Hermine H. M. Maes et al., Inheritance of Physical Fitness in 10-yr-old Twins
and Their Parents, 28 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 1479, 1479 (1996). Twin studies
indicate that performance-related fitness characteristics (such as static strength and running

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

38

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:15

weight, age, or experience.159 In the same fashion, athletes could take
performance-enhancing drugs to compensate for natural deficiencies or bad
luck.160
One problem with this approach is that athletes with natural talent or good
luck also could avail themselves of drugs, thereby maintaining their
advantages. A related objection is that, if one athlete took drugs, all would
have to, just to stay even. The combined result would be a sort of futile arms
race: everyone would be subject to the drug risks without obtaining any
offsetting benefit. But these criticisms assume that enhancements would affect
everyone to the same degree—producing, for example, a fifty-pound increase
in weightlifting ability across the board. This is not necessarily, or likely, to be
the case, because people tend to react somewhat differently to biological
interventions.161 Even if all athletes used drugs, a competitor might hope that
he or she would derive a greater advantage than the next person. But more
importantly, the same criticism can be lodged against all efforts to improve
athletic performance. If training for many hours every day enables all athletes
to improve, for example, why bother? The athletes would be just as well off if
no one practiced; but sports do not prohibit training, even though training
causes injuries. The question, then, is whether the risks of drugs are
speed) and health-related characteristics (such as flexibility and maximum oxygen uptake) are
moderately to highly heritable. Id. at 1479. Several studies have focused on locating specific
genes for athleticism, with most of the candidates affecting cardiac function. See, e.g., George
Gayagay et al., Elite Endurance Athletes and the ACE I Allele—The Role of Genes in Athletic
Performance, 103 HUM. GENETICS 48 (1998); H. E. Montgomery et al., Human Gene for
Physical Performance, 393 NATURE 221 (1998); Bernd Wolfarth et al., A Polymorphism in the
Alpha2a-Adrenoceptor Gene and Endurance Athlete Status, 32 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE
1709 (2000). Advances in genetic science are likely to make the distribution of natural talent
increasingly less random. As noted earlier, there now is a genetic test for different types of
running prowess; this test could be administered to early-stage embryos fertilized in vitro and the
results employed to select which embryos to implant in the womb. See supra text accompanying
notes 36–37.
159. An interesting question is why other sports do not. Someone once tried to form a
basketball league for players of normal height, but the attempt ultimately failed. See Elizabeth
Comte, WBL: A Short Circuit with a Worldwide Reach, SPORTING NEWS, May 21, 1990, at 44.
160. One of the original justifications put forward by the Olympic Medical Commission for
banning doping was “maintaining equal opportunities for all at the time of competition.” See
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1. It also is curious that the original
rationale spoke in terms of “maintaining” equal opportunities. It can be argued that athletes never
are equal at the moment of competition. Some are born with greater natural abilities. Some have
wealthy parents, or the good luck not to become injured. Not every Olympic gymnast can be
trained by Bela Karoli; not every figure skater is able to grow up like Sarah Hughes, practicing on
her personal backyard ice rink. See Jeff Metcalfe, Poised at the Top, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Feb. 9,
1992, at G1; Linda Robertson, Hughes Continues to Win Fans as She Balances Demands of
Skating, Being 16, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 2002, at 1D.
161. Ultimately, pharmacogenetics may enable these differences in drug response to be
determined in advance.
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sufficiently great, or greater than the risks of other methods of improving
performance, so that drugs should be treated differently. Perhaps this would
validate banning the use of extremely dangerous drugs, but it certainly does not
justify a ban on all substances.
One solution to the futility problem would be to establish a true
handicapping regime that permitted only disadvantaged athletes to use drugs,
and only in sufficient amounts to offset their lack of talent or luck. This would
require methods to identify and measure advantage and disadvantage, which
are likely to be at least as expensive and intrusive as the testing regimes
employed to detect the use of banned substances.162 But perhaps this would be
tolerable in the interest of equality.
Of course, the system would not be fair if enhancements were not available
to everyone. If they were too costly or the supply was too limited regardless of
how much athletes were willing to pay, so that only some athletes were
fortunate enough to obtain the performance advantages, the use of
enhancements could exacerbate, rather than alleviate, inequality. Currently,
this does not seem to be much of a problem. Athletes do not complain that
only some of them have access to certain substances. If anything, the drugs are
too readily available. But a fairness problem could arise in the future if
especially expensive or exotic enhancements were developed. In that case, the
goal of equality might require subsidies so that all competitors could avail
themselves of these substances, or a ban so that none could.
c.

Increasing Fan Appeal

A third potential benefit from performance-enhancing drugs could be
increased value for fans. A substantial number of baseball fans, for example,
do not strongly object to the use of steroids because it enables batters to hit
more home runs. According to a 2005 poll, fans cited the outlandish salaries
of players as the biggest problem facing baseball, followed by steroids, and
then ticket prices.163 When asked directly by journalists about his views on

162. A deliciously wicked depiction of handicapping the talented is provided by Kurt
Vonnegut in the short story Harrison Bergeron, which begins:
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before
God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody
else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker
than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th Amendments
to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States
Handicapper General.
KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7, 7 (1968).
163. Associated Press, Fans Frown on High Pay: Salaries Rank Above Steroids in Latest
Poll, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Apr. 5, 2005, at C5.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

40

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:15

steroids, and specifically Mark McGwire’s congressional testimony,164 Mike
Davidson, the fan who retrieved McGwire’s record-tying sixty-first home run
ball, replied, “It’s no big deal. Like he said, it’s in the past. It really doesn’t
matter.”165 Indeed, more runs may sell more tickets and raise advertising
revenue.
Even if drugs created serious health risks, participants might take them to
enhance fan appeal. Clearly much of the risk inherent in sports is tolerated, if
not encouraged, for this purpose. For many spectators, it is the anticipation of
beholding injury and even death that makes them watch sports events. Think
of automobile or downhill ski racing, even football and hockey, not to mention
boxing. These sports easily could be made much safer: cars could have
governors set at low speeds, more speed control gates could be placed on
downhill ski runs, tackle football could be replaced with touch, and so on. But
these safety measures would make the sporting events less exciting and less
remunerative.
In summary, performance-enhancing drugs may yield cognizable benefits:
allowing players to play better, compensating for deficiencies in natural talent
and luck, and boosting fan appreciation. The question, then, is whether these
benefits outweigh the risks.
This question is hard to answer because of the lack of efficacy and safety
information on doping substances. As noted above, the only study on the use
of anabolic steroids by athletes found that they increased muscle mass, but the
study only lasted ten weeks.166 Similarly, little information is available about
the safety and efficacy of HGH as a performance-enhancer in sports.167
Moreover, this lack of information is perpetuated by doping critics and
bioethicists who maintain that it would be unethical to conduct studies in
human subjects on the safety and efficacy of banned substances.168 This stance
164. Former St. Louis Cardinal Mark McGwire, rather than address whether he had in fact
taken steroids during his career, consistently responded to Congressional questioning that he was
“not here to talk about the past.” Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 242.
165. Gary Smith, Steroids and Baseball: What Do We Do Now?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar.
28, 2005, at 40 (conducting extensive interviews with fans who were integrally involved in Mark
McGwire’s and Sammy Sosa’s home run contest in 1998).
166. Bhasin et al., supra note 124, at 1–2. The treatment period lasted 10 weeks, but the
study included a 4-week control period and a 16-week recovery period. Id.
167. The few controlled studies that have been conducted on the effect of HGH in athletes
have not shown that it has a significant positive effect on muscle growth or strength. See
Matthias M. Weber, Effects of Growth Hormone on Skeletal Muscle, 58 HORMONE RES. 43, 46
(2002). Although HGH appears to increase lean body mass in non-HGH deficient individuals,
this is attributable to water retention rather than to an increase in lean muscle mass. Id. at 45.
Moreover, athletes may not inject actual HGH but ingest “precursor” substances, which are
ineffective since HGH is broken down when orally administered. Juhn, supra note 146, at 930.
168. See, e.g., Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 517 (“Because of ethical
considerations, only relatively low doses for a limited time period can be studied.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

DOPING IN SPORTS AND THE USE OF STATE POWER

41

is an artifact of the belief, described earlier, that doping cannot have a
legitimate purpose, and therefore, a priori, there is no possible benefit that
could offset any risks. If, as argued in the forgoing Sections, this argument is
fallacious, there would seem to be no valid reason to maintain this embargo.
2.

Ethics of Sport

A second reason put forth by the Olympic Medical Commission in 1967
for banning doping in sports was “[d]efending medical and sports ethics”169
and WADA continues to cite “against the spirit of sports” as a ground for
prohibiting particular substances.170
Numerous sociologists and philosophers have attempted to describe the
ethics or “spirit” of sport in order to identify what performance aids should and
should not be permitted. Thomas Murray argues that doping is incompatible
with what we admire about sports.171 According to this view, sports only value
certain inputs: determination, effort, natural talent, and luck. An athlete who
wins because she is driven to succeed, puts in endless hours of training and
practice, has innate athletic ability, and enjoys the good fortune, say, of having
wealthy, supportive parents and of avoiding injury, is entitled to her medal.
She is being “authentic.”172
Yet as the earlier discussion shows, the use of performance-enhancing
substances in sports has a long tradition.173 In fact, it is only in the last fifty
years or so that the notion that drug use is incompatible with sports has become
fashionable.174 Moreover, even now there are many sports that do not ban
doping (because they do not test athletes). These include some highly
169. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1.
170. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Under WADA’s approach, some
performance-enhancing substances presumably would be consistent with the spirit of sports, but
WADA gives no clue as to how identify them. Based on the current list of prohibited substances,
permitted substances would seem to include food, vitamins, some dietary supplements, and
certain gases. See generally WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: THE
2005 PROHIBITED LIST: INTERNATIONAL STANDARD (2005) [hereinafter WADA 2005
PROHIBITED LIST], available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/list_2005.pdf.
The permissible gases category is the basis for nitrogen tents and houses, which manipulate the
ratios of gases in the atmosphere to reproduce artificially the effects of sleeping at altitude. See
supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
171. See Thomas H. Murray, The Ethics of Drugs in Sports, in DRUGS AND PERFORMANCE IN
SPORTS 11, 15 (Richard H. Strauss, ed. 1987) (“[D]rugs and other performance aids should be
banned because they do not reflect the forms of human excellence that sports are intended to
honor.”).
172. See Erik Parens, Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the
Enhancement Debate, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34, 35 (2005) (“[W]e are authentic when we
exhibit or are in possession of what is most our own: our own way of flourishing or being
fulfilled.”).
173. See discussion supra Part I.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 49–65.
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organized events, such as certain “powerlifting” and “strongman”
competitions,175 as well as virtually all intramural and informal
competitions.176 These sports may not make players rich or command high
advertising revenues, but they are clearly valued.
Another reason why drugs are against the spirit of sports, it can be said, is
that they eliminate the need for hard work. Being unearned, the argument may
go, doping victories are neither achieved nor deserved. Some argue that
“[v]ictory is inextricably linked to rules. It is questionable whether the drug
taking athlete has competed in the first place.”177 But many of the ingredients
of victory in sports, including natural talent, wealthy and indulgent parents,
and good luck, are not earned. An important factor in winning Olympic and
World Cup alpine skiing events, for example, is having the best equipment.
Racing ski manufacturers test their skis on speed tracks and dole out the fastest
to racers based on the racers’ international ranking and, it seems, favoritism.178
For years, for example, the Atomic Ski Company gave first pick to the
Austrian team.179 Moreover, athletes may have acquired the money to buy
enhancements through hard work and self-sacrifice. In addition, the user must
decide what tasks to undertake, and the decision to do something praiseworthy,
175. Several powerlifting organizations do not test any athletes, or have separate test and nontest divisions. The International Powerlifting Association (IPA) has an “amateur” division that
tests for steroids and a “professional” division that does not. INTERNATIONAL POWERLIFTING
ASSOCIATION, BY-LAWS 9, http://www.ipapower.com/Forms/IPABY-LawsComplete2.pdf. The
IPA bylaws state that any individual in the amateur division found to have a positive drug test
will be moved into the professional division. Id. Similarly, the World Powerlifting Congress and
the American Powerlifting Federation do not test for anabolic substances, but have offshoot
organizations, the Amateur World Powerlifting Congress and the Amateur American Powerlifting
Federation, with identical rules except that they conduct drug testing. World Powerlifting
Congress, http://worldpowerliftingcongress.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006); Amateur American
Powerlifing Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.apf-illinois.com/FAQ.html (last visited Jan.
8, 2006). Other organizations that have both tested and non-tested divisions include the World
Powerlifting Alliance/American Powerlifting Association and the United States Powerlifting
Federation. Powerlifting Federation Rule Cross Reference Chart, http://www.weighttrainer
sunited.com/fedreference.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). The World Powerlifting Organization is
strictly non-tested. Id.
176. The CDC estimates that as many as 150 million Americans participate in some form of
physical leisure activity outside of organized sports. CDC REPORT, supra note 142, at 736.
177. SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 304 (2d ed. 2001).
178. See Bill McCollom, Speed Jumps: Why Fast Skis Matter and How the U.S. Team Got
‘Em, Sept. 29, 2003, FRANCONIA SKI CLUB, http://www.franconiaskiclub.com/PDFs/Speed%20
jumps%20and%20fast%20skis.pdf.
179. Id. McCollom explains that U.S. racers began to obtain improved access to the top pairs
of skis after the U.S. Ski and Snowboard Association “made the commitment to provide our
servicemen more opportunity to go to the factories and establish relationships; we allotted more
time and resources for testing; we hired personnel to help coordinate service from the factories.”
Id. As a result, U.S. racer Daron Rahlves received second pick behind Austrian Stephan
Eberharter. Id.
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rather than, say, to use the drugs to commit crimes or for other forms of illgotten gain, confers merit. In any event, individuals are likely to have to
expend considerable effort to produce results even if they take enhancement
drugs. Athletes who take steroids, for example, still must work very hard to be
competitive. Indeed, one effect of drugs may be to enable athletes to train
harder without injuring themselves. In that sense, the drugs can make it
possible to work more, not less.
3.

Protecting Children

A third rationale that has been asserted lately, particularly in congressional
hearings on the use of steroids in professional sports, is the need to discourage
the use of performance-enhancing drugs by children. As Rep. John Sweeney
(R-NY) testified, for example:
As athletes have become more creative; turning to substances such as andro
and its muscle-building cousins, our children have become more susceptible to
the allure of performance-enhancing substances. While the integrity of sports
is significant, the use of steroids in sports would not be of such profound
concern if it did not impact children so drastically.180

In some cases, the objection to the use of performance-enhancing drugs by
children is based on what appear to be sound safety concerns. Adolescents
using anabolic steroids, for example, may experience irreversible early closure
of growth plates.181 Clearly it would be appropriate to prevent young people,
who are presumed to lack the capacity to make informed, rational choices,
from engaging in especially risky behaviors. But note that this rationale could
apply to many common sports that children routinely engage in, including
tackle football, hockey, and skateboarding. Moreover, there may be some
performance-enhancing drugs that do not pose serious health risks, even for
children.182
180. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004 Hearing, supra note 134, at 6 (statement of Rep.
John Sweeney).
181. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 536.
182. It is unclear whether researchers ever would be allowed to test performance-enhancing
drugs in children. The “Common Rule,” which establishes the ethical and regulatory norms for
human subjects research in the U.S., states that research on minors which does not pose more
than minimal risk is permitted so long as the researchers obtain parental permission and the
minors give their assent. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404. Research on minors that poses more than minimal
risk is permitted only if it holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject, and
then only if the institutional review board finds that the risk is justified by the anticipated benefit
to the subjects. Id. § 46.405.
Parents traditionally have had broad latitude to enhance the lives of their children. From
a legal standpoint, the only prohibition is against actions that would constitute child abuse or
neglect. The question, then, is whether enrolling a child in a study of performance-enhancing
drugs would amount to abuse or neglect. In a recent case, a Maryland court ruled that children
could not be enrolled in any non-therapeutic study that presented any risk of injury or damage to
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Another concern with children in particular is that the use of performanceenhancing drugs could lead to the use of illicit recreational drugs. As Senator
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) stated in 1989 hearings on steroid use in football:
[A]s experts have told us, and we will hear today and in future hearings,
steroids could become another “gate-way drug,” a phrase that’s now being
used. “Gate-way” drug refers to marijuana, cocaine and other drugs. If young
people accept the idea that using steroids to build their body is okay, they may
be all the more likely to try other drugs to alter their minds, as well as their
bodies.183

There are no data to substantiate this concern, but it stands to reason that
children who perceived that there were benefits from using one type of
prohibited substance would be more likely to use other types. On the other
hand, the problem may be with the illicit status of the performance-enhancing
drugs rather than with the fact that they improve performance. Children

health. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 850 (Md. 2001). Nor could parents
lawfully consent to their participation. Id. at 858. Subsequently, the court issued a clarification
stating that it had intended to ban only pediatric research that posed “any articulable risk beyond
the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor.” Id. at 862. However, the court went
on to note that the study in question—intended to identify economically feasible ways of
protecting children from lead poisoning—could not proceed because it did not have a therapeutic
objective: “The context of the statement was a non-therapeutic study that promises no medical
benefit to the child whatever, so that any balance between risk and benefit is necessarily
negative.” Id. The court clearly implied that, because enhancement research promises no
medical benefit to the child, it would be unethical to carry out enhancement research on children
unless the study posed no risk whatsoever. The court’s position in Grimes seems to be in accord
with the position of the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
in regard to genetic enhancement, which states that it would be unethical to attempt to genetically
enhance children unless there was “no trade-off with other characteristics or traits.” American
Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal
Genetic Testing, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 633 (1994).
The need to consider the research status of children in performance enhancement studies
is heightened by the fact that minors already are the subjects of considerable informal
enhancement experimentation. See, e.g., Sean Esteban McCabe et al., Prevalence and Correlates
of Illicit Methylphenidate Use Among 8th, 10th, and 12th Grade Students in the United States,
2001, 35 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 501 (2004). Parents, for example, are reported to ask
physicians to prescribe HGH for their children although the children do not meet the labeling
indications for the drug, and the use of amphetamine (Adderall) and methylphenidate (Ritalin) as
study aids by students who do not suffer from ADHD is widely reported. Id.; Christian J. Teter et
al., Illicit Methylphenidate Use in an Undergraduate Student Sample: Prevalence and Risk
Factors, 23 PHARMACOTHERAPY 609, 609 (2003); Rebecca L. Weber, A Drug Kids Take in
Search of Better Grades, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2004, at 11.
183. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports—The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid
Abuse: Hearings on The Steroid Abuse Problem in America, Focusing on the Use of Steroids in
College and Professional Football Today Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2
(1989) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
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receive all sorts of legitimate medications without, it seems, concluding that if
one type of drug is good, all drugs must be good.
But even if it made sense to restrict the use of performance-enhancing
drugs by children, why ban their use by adults? Adults are permitted to engage
in all sorts of behaviors that are deemed bad or deleterious for children, such as
drinking, smoking, or sex. The main reason to single out athletes is that they
serve as role models for kids. For example, the chair of the House committee
investigating steroid use in baseball in 2005 commented: “Our primary focus
remains on the message being sent to . . . children who play baseball, children
who idolize and emulate professional baseball players.”184 But even role
models are entitled to personal freedoms. So long as the adults make it clear
that the rules are different for adults and children, and so long as role models
such as professional athletes do not actively promote enhancements, such as in
television ads, it is unclear why they should be prohibited from using
enhancements but permitted to engage in other adult activities. As a ski
patroller, one of the Authors deals with lots of injured youngsters who “just
wanted to see if they could do that flip like the guy on TV.” This does not
mean that we have to eliminate freestyle skiing from the Olympics.
In many cases, parents and others who bridle at the notion of children
using performance-enhancing drugs to be competitive are concerned not only
by the use of drugs but by the highly competitive, even cut-throat endeavor
that many juvenile sports activities have become. This is truly a sad state of
affairs, and it is not clear how to go about correcting it. But given that we live
increasingly in a winner-take-all society, a legitimate question arises why those
who do not have a great deal of natural talent or good luck should be barred
from using biomedical enhancements to compete more successfully against
those who do.
To summarize, a blanket prohibition against doping in sports cannot be
justified on the basis of safety concerns, sports ethics, or even protecting
children. It might be tempting to conclude, therefore, that those in charge of
sports are just being arbitrary, that they are singling out performanceenhancing drugs for no real reason. But it is important to realize that it is
perfectly acceptable for the rules of sports to be arbitrary. A sport must have
rules to be a coherent activity, and must be played within the rules for it to
have meaning as a sport.185 As a child, you may have tried to play a game in
which the individual players made up the rules to suit them as they went; no
doubt you quickly abandoned it in frustration at its pointlessness. Think of the

184. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Chairman Tom
Davis).
185. The same is true of games.
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Queen of Heart’s croquet game in Alice in Wonderland.186 Furthermore, the
rules of sport can be, and often are, completely arbitrary. Why does baseball
only permit nine players in the field, for example, instead of five or eleven?
But this still leaves open the question of why sports have chosen to ban the
use of drugs. Even if it is difficult to identify reasons that justify it, are there
factors that may explain it?
4.

The War on Drugs

As described earlier, the effort to halt the use of doping began in the mid1960s with the formation of the Olympic Medical Commission, which
established the Olympic drug testing program.187 This timing reveals one
impetus for the anti-doping campaign: The war against doping started out to a
large extent as part of the wider “War on Drugs.” It is no coincidence that the
Olympic Medical Commission was created around the same time that Richard
Nixon became President with a pledge to suppress the youth-oriented drug
culture.188 Nor is it happenstance that WADA’s list of banned substances
includes recreational drugs such as marijuana, as well as drugs that enhance
performance.189 Thus, British Olympic gold medalist Mark Lewis-Francis lost
his silver medal from the 2005 European Indoor Track-and-Field
Championships after he tested positive for marijuana;190 a runner with a
positive marijuana test was disqualified from the U.S. 400-meter relay team at
the Athens Olympics;191 and, most notably, Canadian snowboarder Ross
Rebagliati lost and then regained his gold medal in snowboarding at the 1998
Nagano Olympics (which led to the formal addition of marijuana to the list of
banned substances).192
5.

The Cold War

Another key motivation for the campaign against doping was the Cold
War. International competition between East and West carried over to the
sports arena; recall the elation when the American hockey team beat the

186. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 59–65 (Project
Gutenberg ed., The Millennium Fulcrum Edition 3.0 1994) (1865).
187. See supra text accompanying note 73.
188. See Kate Doyle, Operation Intercept: The Perils of Unilateralism, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE,
Apr. 13, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86.
189. See WADA 2005 PROHIBITED LIST, supra note 170, at §§ S1–S9.
190. David Martin, Lewis-Francis Avoids Ban for Failed Dope Test: British Sprinter Denies
Cannabis Use, But Loses Medal, THE SCOTSMAN (Gr. Brit.), May 14, 2005, at 20.
191. Bill Ward, Capel Admits Mistake, Moves Forward, TBO.COM, Aug. 29, 2004,
http://olympics.tbo.com/olympics/MGBIPXKOGYD.html.
192. Associated Press, Olympics: Marijuana Becomes Banned Substance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1998, at C5.
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Soviets at Lake Placid.193 A main factor in the success of communist bloc
athletes was the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs. In the
mid-1970s, communist nations began aggressive, state-sponsored doping
programs.194 Combined with a rigorous talent screening system, doping
programs in Eastern Europe were remarkably successful in producing
champion athletes.195 The programs were organized at the highest levels of
government and included not just coaches and trainers, but the secret police
At the 1976 Montreal
and nationalized pharmaceutical companies.196
Olympics and 1988 Seoul games “the Soviet team had a hospitality ship used
as medical centre to ensure that Soviet competitors were ‘clean’ at the last
moment.”197 The Olympics cracked down on doping when it became apparent
that victorious Warsaw Bloc athletes, especially the East Germans, were more
flagrantly and successfully employing steroids than other teams.198
But the Cold War is over, while the war on performance-enhancing drugs
persists.
6.

Nostalgia

Another incentive for banning drugs in sports is nostalgia. People yearn
for a simpler time when star athletes like Babe Ruth broke records without the
use of steroids.199 As former pitcher Senator Jim Bunning stated:

193. See Joe Lapointe, Impossible Dream Plus One Decade: 10 Years After U.S. Gold-Medal
Effort, Victors and Losers Play Side by Side, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at C1.
194. Alan Cowell, In a Cold War Hangover, Germany Confronts a Legacy of Steroids, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 8 (Sports), at 1.
195. See WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 142.
196. Id. at 143–44.
197. JAMES RIORDAN, SPORT, POLITICS AND COMMUNISM 123 (1991).
198. See WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12.
199. Of course, since there were no drug tests at the time, it is impossible to know whether
Ruth or other athletes were using other substances to enhance performance. A related objection
to the use of performance-enhancing drugs is that it confounds record-keeping in sports. As
Senator John McCain stated in 2004: “The failure to insist on stringent drug testing policies
damages the integrity of the games, calls into question records set by those suspected of using
performance-enhancing drugs, and puts in peril the health of the athletes who play the games.”
Steroid Use in Professional and Amateur Sports: Hearing on S. 253 Before S. Comm. on Com.,
Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=
1100&wit_id=2191. Yet, the same problem arguably occurs every time a major change is made
in the rules, including allowing the use of improved equipment. Pole-vaulting apparently has
been able to cope with the introduction of fiberglass poles in the early 1960s, even though
competitors were suddenly able to vault much greater heights and old records were rendered
obsolete. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Similarly, baseball fans have dealt with the
results of the designated-hitter rule, although not without grumbling. See Mel Antonen, DH at
30: Hit, Miss: Rule Has Increased Offense and Extended Careers, but Some Say Time Has Come
for AL to Get Rid of It, USA TODAY, July 14, 2003, at 1C; Bill Dawson, DH at 30: Rule Still
Enrages Purists, but Many Hitters Relish Role, S.D. UNION-TRIB., May 12, 2003, at C2.
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Mr. Chairman, maybe I’m old fashioned. I remembered players didn’t get any
better as they got older. We all got worse. When I played with Henry Aaron
and Willie Mays and Ted Williams, they didn’t put on 40 pounds and bulk up
in their careers and they didn’t hit more home runs in their late 30’s than they
did in their late 20’s.200

Senator Byron Dorgan put it this way: “Tragically, what once was a ‘field of
dreams’ may deteriorate into a quagmire of controlled substances . . . .”201
Yet as the history of doping shows, drug use was the norm in the past,
rather than the exception.202 Evidently there was a halcyon period when many
older Americans came of age in which the use of drugs was unremarked, if not
absent. Even if the belief that sports in the past were drug-free is an illusion, it
may be a comforting illusion at a time of rapid and unsettling technological
change. Some nostalgia buffs prefer to try to hit targets with Civil War-type,
black powder rifles. Continued opposition to the use of drugs in sports may be
an attempt to preserve a world as lost in time as the muzzle-loading
sharpshooters of the Civil War.
7.

Aesthetics

Another key explanation for the opposition to the use of performanceenhancing drugs in sports, however, is aesthetics. People simply find the idea
of athletes using drugs ugly. In part, this is a reaction against graphic images
of drug use. The initial crackdown on steroids, for example, had a lot to do
with the rumors of syringes scattered across locker room floors in the Olympic
villages of the 1950s.203 The toughening of testing programs in the 1980s
probably was due not only to the desire to stop Warsaw bloc teams from
continuing their string of victories, but to the repulsive masculine appearance
of some of their female athletes who were taking steroids.204
This is not to demean the importance of aesthetics. Aesthetics enables us
to identify what is beautiful. It ignites powerful emotions, as evidenced by the
vitriolic language used by sports writers to describe the steroid scandal in
baseball, who called it “a blot on baseball”205 and characterized it as being
worse than the Black Sox scandal of 1919, the Pittsburgh cocaine trials in

200. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 57.
201. Press Release, Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Opening Statement at Senate Hearing Looking
Into Reports of Steroid Use in Baseball (June 18, 2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/061802dorgan.pdf.
202. See discussion supra Part I.
203. See James B. Jacobs & Bruce Samuels, The Drug Testing Project in International
Sports: Dilemmas in an Expanding Regulatory Regime, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
557, 562 (1995).
204. See ALLEN GUTTMANN, THE OLYMPICS: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN GAMES 146
(2002).
205. Editorial, Steroids a Blot on Baseball, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2004, at 18A.
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1985, and Pete Rose gambling on games while managing the Cincinnati
Reds.206 Distastefulness certainly can kill a sport; witness what happened to
XFL football.207 Aesthetic opposition by fans also blocked a plan to place
Spiderman 2 logos on baseball bases.208
But it is important to realize the difference between aesthetic objections
and moral objections. It would be wrong to smuggle a modern weapon into a
Civil War-type, black powder rifle shooting competition. Yet there is nothing
wrong with conducting shooting matches using modern guns. Similarly, there
is nothing inherently wrong with allowing the use of performance-enhancing
drugs in sports.
III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
If the use of drugs in sports ultimately cannot be deemed immoral, what is
the proper role of the government in enforcing the ban on doping?209

206. Tim Cowlishaw, Going, Going . . . Gone: Baseball’s Integrity is Vanishing, But Steroids
Scandal Won’t Go Away, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004, at 1C.
207. On February 3, 2000, the World Wrestling Federation announced its concept for a new
kind of football league: one with fewer rules, trash-talking announcers, and barely dressed
cheerleaders. See Jim Baker, Grapes Sour on Burns’ Treatment, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 4, 2000,
at 90. Featuring gimmicky camera techniques, behind the scenes looks at the cheerleader locker
rooms, and player jerseys with nicknames like “He Hate Me,” the XFL debuted the following
year. Jay Mariotti, Trashing the Garbage of the XFL, SPORTING NEWS, May 21, 2001, at 7.
Although its opening games drew large audiences, attendance at games and television ratings
quickly plummeted. Id. The end of the season games drew the smallest audiences ever for prime
time television and the XFL folded shortly thereafter. Don Walker, He Fold Me: McMahon
Smacks Down XFL Due to Tiny Ratings, Huge Losses, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 11, 2001,
at 1C. As soon as the XFL debuted, commentators were intensely critical of its gimmicks,
theatrics, and attitudes toward women. See, e.g., Harvey Araton, Football and Taste, Out of
Season, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001. Although the format changed during the season, adding real
commentators and toning down the trash talking, the XFL could not attract an audience. See
Walker, supra, at 1C. Following its cancellation, critics were quick to judge the XFL’s
precipitous decline. ESPN commentator Jay Mariotti offered his gratitude “to the masses for
smacking down this farcical disgrace to civilized culture.” Mariotti, supra, at 7. Other writers
called the league’s folding “the year’s most hopeful sign that we have a future as a society.”
Randy Brown, XFL’s Failure a Success for U.S., TIMES UNION (Albany), May 22, 2001, at A9.
A headline in the Seattle Times proclaimed: “XFL Benched, Taste Wins.” Editorial, XFL
Benched, Taste Wins, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 2001, at B4.
208. See Michael McCarthy, Sports and Entertainment are Double-Teaming Fans, USA
TODAY, June 16, 2005, at 1C.
209. The United States government has long been involved in efforts to restrict access to
drugs of abuse. Following the Civil War, Congress turned its attention to opium, which had
become popular among soldiers as a painkiller during the war and remained popular after. See
Barbara Heise, The Historical Context of Addiction in the Nursing Profession: 1850–1982, 14 J.
ADDICTIONS NURSING 117, 118 (2003). Heroin was first synthesized from morphine in 1874,
although it did not become commercially available until 1898. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987).
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While the importation of opium peaked in 1896, it was another eighteen years before
Congress enacted federal narcotics control: the Harrison Narcotics Act. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38
Stat. 785 (1914). The Harrison Act established prescription requirements for narcotics and
required those dispensing drugs to be registered and taxed. Id. However, it failed to address
whether pharmacists and physicians could dispense narcotics for the sole purpose of supporting
an addict’s habit. David T. Courtwright, The Hidden Epidemic: Opiate Addiction and Cocaine
Use in the South, 1860–1920, 49 J. S. HIST. 57, 58 (1983). The issue was resolved by the
Supreme Court in 1919, ruling against maintenance prescriptions. Id. Public objection to
intoxicating substances was strong, and in 1920, Congress banned consumption of alcohol by
passing the Volstead Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), in conjunction with Prohibition.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933 by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI). Other substance
control laws followed: the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act was passed in 1922 (also
known as the Jones-Miller Act), Pub. L. No. 67-227, 42 Stat. 596 (1922), which increased
penalties for drug violations and further restricted the importation of opium and coca, and the
proscription of domestic manufacture and possession of heroin became illegal in 1924. Andrew
G. Bucaro & Mary Williams Cazalas, Methadone: Treatment and Control of Narcotic Addiction,
44 TUL. L. REV. 14, 18 (1969). At the same time, changes in bureaucracy affected how drugs
were regulated. In 1927, the Bureau of Chemistry was divided into two separate agencies: Food,
Drug, and Insecticide Administration (regulatory functions) and the Bureau of Soils and
Chemistry (non-regulatory functions). Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html.
Three years later, FDIA became the Food and Drug Administration under an agricultural
appropriations act. Id. Congress also saw fit to establish the Federal Bureau of Narcotics with
Henry Anslinger as commissioner.
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, WIKIPEDIA.ORG,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Federal_Bureau_of_Narcotics. Beginning in 1930, the enforcement
of drug laws became the province of the Justice Department. María Celia Toro, The
Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico, 86 J. AM. HIST. ¶ 5 (1999),
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/86.2/ toro.html. The push for the control of drugs
continued with the passage of the Uniform State Narcotic Act in 1932. Annotation,
Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 119 A.L.R. 1399
(2004). Eventually adopted by thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, the Act sought to
standardize state narcotics control laws. Id.
While states and the federal government routinely criminalized drug offenses related to
narcotics, they were far more lax about other drugs. In 1937, the federal government elected only
to tax marijuana and not criminalize it. Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551
(1937). Following World War II, the federal government passed increasing amounts of drug
control legislation. In 1951, the Humphrey-Durham Drug Prescriptions Act defined the kinds of
drugs that could not be safely used without medical supervision and restricted their sale to
prescription by a licensed practitioner. Pub. L. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951). That same year, the
Boggs Amendment increased the penalties for drug violations. Pub. L. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767
(1951). Five years later, the Daniels Amendment further revised penalties. Pub. L. No. 84-728,
70 Stat. 567 (1956).
The United States also began working in earnest with the international community to
address the perceived ills of drug abuse. In 1961, the United Nations promulgated the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, an international treaty which criminalized the manufacture and
trafficking of drugs. Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
convention_1961_en.pdf (last visted Jan. 8, 2006). Whereas previous treaties only controlled
specific substances (like opium), the Single Convention consolidated those treaties and added
cannabis to its list of banned substances. Id. at Preamble, Art. 28. The United States’ compliance
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Rationales

What justifies the government’s intervention in the war against doping?
More specifically, is there a need for government involvement when there are
sports organizations to establish and police anti-doping programs?
1.

Safety

The government would be justified in getting involved in the war against
doping if sports organizations were not adequately protecting athletes’ safety.
When Juan Samaranch was president of the IOC, for example, there were
numerous complaints that he was not serious enough about enforcing the
Olympic ban on doping.210 Lax rules and enforcement were major themes
during the Congressional hearings about steroids in professional sports. 211

with the treaty eventually took the form of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801–971 (2000)).
Prior to the enactment of the CSA, Congress recognized the growing need to address
non-narcotic substances. The Drug Abuse Control Amendments were enacted to deal with
problems caused by abuse of stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens. Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79
Stat. 226 (1965). Enforcement was also being stepped up, with new powers given to the Justice
Department. The FDA Bureau of Drug Abuse Control and the Treasury Department Bureau of
Narcotics were transferred to the Department of Justice to form the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, effectively consolidating drug policing. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug
Law History, supra. The CSA served to give these new agencies something to consistently
enforce. It specifically designated drugs (including opiates, coca, cannabis, stimulants,
depressants, and hallucinogens) into five different schedules, regulating access and establishing
penalties for misuse. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000). The CSA, which is still in force, brought the
United States into compliance with the UN treaty and has been widely copied by the states.
Amendments have been added to specifically control certain classes of drugs, particularly
psychotropics. Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 37-68 (1978) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
801a (2000)). Since the enactment of the CSA, Congress has acted to increase penalties and deal
with designer drugs. Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). Congress has also created various
offices to address the problems associated with drug abuse, including the Drug Enforcement
Administration in 1973, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1988. Drug
Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2006) (establishment of DEA); Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (establishment of
Office of National Drug Control Policy). It has also taken a hard line towards anabolic steroids.
Although not originally included in the Controlled Substances Act, anabolic steroids have been
subject to increasing regulation with both the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4851, and the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118
Stat. 1661.
210. See, e.g., Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 137, at 1 (statement of
Sen. John McCain) (“Revelations about the use of performance enhancing drugs have served to
both expose the complexity of the challenge of detection and enforcement of drug policies, and
the gross shortcomings of the existing United States Olympic Committee and the International
Olympic Committee efforts to address the challenge.”); Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden)
(“[T]he International Olympic Committee has announced and then failed to actually follow
through on concrete plans to curb doping. They have talked, yet again, about initiating changes
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An interesting question is why sports might not do enough to protect
athletes’ health. If steroids are in fact dangerous, then it should be an
important function of governing bodies to protect athletes from such hazards.
Unfortunately, politics has largely prevented the regulation of doping,
particularly by the IOC. Juan Samaranch was accused of ignoring doping
among Chinese athletes in exchange for a Nobel Peace Prize nomination.212
Also, an important factor in professional sports is the collective bargaining
power of the athletes themselves. Yet it is curious that players would resist
strong doping controls if steroids and other performance-enhancing substances
were as dangerous as some make them out to be. One explanation is that the
players are concerned primarily with the procedural fairness of the anti-doping
system. Despite the introduction of a new anti-doping hierarchy (led by
WADA) in 1999,213 athletes are still critical of the testing process, as it

for the 2000 games, but my sense is that nobody should stay up waiting to see these reforms
actually put in place.”).
211. See, e.g., NBA Hearing, supra note 8, at 2.
But we are still left with some questions, given the fact that the NBA’s testing program
has some “Shaq-sized” holes in it: How do we know for sure there is no steroid problem if
testing policies aren’t that strong? If there is little or no upside to using steroids in
basketball, shouldn’t the NBA then have the strongest of all the sports? . . .
. . . What we are trying to understand is a policy that tests all non-rookies just once a
year, and not at all during the regular season; trying to understand the policy under which
a first steroids offense results in a mere five-game suspension, the equivalent of 6% of the
regular NBA season. Compare that to the NFL, where the first offense is punished by a
suspension of four games, or 25% of the regular season. This is a difference in the impact
on a player’s pocketbook, where it probably hurts the most and has the most enforcement.
Id. (statement of Chairman Tom Davis).
We need to know if the policy is adequate in terms of how the tests are done and the
punishments and the scope. As Mr. Waxman and I wrote to Major League Baseball and
the Players Association yesterday, there are real doubts about this new policy and all that
it’s cracked up to be. . . .
Over the years, there have been a consistent drip, drip, drip of information about
steroids in baseball with not much of a response from Major League Baseball. After all, it
was in large part due to congressional pressure that the current policy took shape.
Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Chairman Tom Davis).
Like I said before, I think the new policy that suspends players for steroid use is a baby
step forward. Personally, I think the penalties are really puny. I would like to see much
stronger ones. One-month suspension for a first offense and from what I have read today,
that isn’t really what happens. A year for a second. And then 1-month suspension for a
first offense is what it should be, a year for a second and then the third strike and you are
out, out of the game. Football has a much stronger penalty and everyone agrees its
program has worked.
Id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Jim Bunning).
212. See Galluzzi, supra note 85, at 97–98.
213. World Anti-Doping Agency History, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page
Category.id=253 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
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frequently does not give them the opportunity to refute doping allegations.214
Some have sued to challenge their tests and suspensions, arguing that they
were unfairly forced to bear the burden of proof and suspended without
hearings.215 Another explanation is that players are not convinced that doping
is dangerous, or that they are willing to take the risks in return for the rewards
of playing better.
The benefits of doping also undoubtedly motivate professional team
owners and leagues to resist stringent anti-doping programs. These benefits
include greater fan appeal from better playing, especially from more
spectacular performance such as hitting more home runs.
Government concern for the safety of players is especially appropriate
when the players are not in a position to balance risks and benefits for
themselves. One group to which this applies is juveniles. Therefore, it is
certainly appropriate for government-run sports organizations—that is, public
school and state university sports programs—to ban dangerous doping by
minors.216
On the other hand, the government is not justified in using the concern
about doping in sports as a pretext for extending the war on drugs beyond
constitutionally permissible boundaries. In 1991, when James Acton entered
the seventh grade at the Washington Grade School in the tiny logging town of
Vernonia, Oregon, he decided he wanted to play football.217 To his and his
parents’ surprise, he was told that he had to agree to undergo drug testing.218
He would be tested at the beginning of the season, and randomly thereafter, not
for steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs, but for marijuana,
cocaine, and amphetamines (which, although used for performance
enhancement, were targeted by the school primarily because of recreational
abuse).219 Upon being notified of a test, James would have to produce a
specimen at a urinal in the presence of an adult monitor, who would watch and
listen for the normal sounds of urination (Girls were allowed to use a closed
stall while the monitor listened outside and then checked to see that the sample
was at body temperature).220

214. See, e.g., Longman, supra note 104, at D1; Sprinter Wants Public Dope Hearing, CBS
NEWS, June 16, 2004, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/31/national/main633257.shtml.
215. See Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process
in International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523 (2002) (discussing the changes implemented in the
Sydney Olympics and comparing the new system to the pre-Sydney system). Straubel concludes
that while the new system offers better due process protections for athletes, it still fails to offer
athletes wide-ranging protection. Id. at 570–72.
216. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (detailing child protection rationale for ban on doping).
217. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 649, 650.
220. Id. at 650.
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James and his parents sued the school district to block the testing
program.221 They argued that in previous cases, the United States Supreme
Court had made it clear that government entities, including public schools,
could not conduct random drug testing.222 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
parents, but the Supreme Court reversed its decision and held that public
schools could randomly test student-athletes.223
In its decision, the Supreme Court described the link between illicit drug
use and athletes’ psychological and physical safety.224 In the Court’s opinion,
safety risks were especially great in sports:
Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly
to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to
the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.
Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow
reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs
screened by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial
physical risks to athletes. Amphetamines produce an “artificially induced
heart rate increase, [p]eripheral vasoconstriction, [b]lood pressure increase,
and [m]asking of the normal fatigue response,” making them a “very
dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type. . . .” Marijuana causes
“[i]rregular blood pressure responses during changes in body position,”
“[r]eduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood,” and “[i]nhibition of
the normal sweating responses resulting in increased body temperature. . . .”
Cocaine produces “[v]asoconstriction[,] [e]levated blood pressure,” and
“possible coronary artery spasms and myocardial infarction.”225

The Court also pointed out that drug use by student athletes could impel other
students to use illegal drugs: “It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem
largely fueled by the ‘role model’ effect of athletes’ drug use, and of particular
danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not
use drugs.”226
Justice O’Connor, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
however, was not convinced that the connection between illicit drug use and
school athletics was strong enough to pass constitutional muster:
I find unreasonable the school’s choice of student athletes as the class to
subject to suspicionless testing—a choice that appears to have been driven

221. Id. at 651–52.
222. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652; See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
223. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 651, 664–66.
224. Id. at 661.
225. Id. at 662 (quoting Jerald Hawkins, Drugs and Other Ingesta: Effects on Athletic
Performance, in MANAGING SPORTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 90, 90–94 (Herb
Appenzeller ed., 1993).
226. Id. at 663.
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more by a belief in what would pass constitutional muster . . . than by a belief
in what was required to meet the District’s principal disciplinary concern.
Reading the full record in this case, as well as the District Court’s authoritative
summary of it, . . . it seems quite obvious that the true driving force behind the
District’s adoption of its drug testing program was the need to combat the rise
in drug-related disorder and disruption in its classrooms and around campus. I
mean no criticism of the strength of that interest. On the contrary, where the
record demonstrates the existence of such a problem, that interest seems selfevidently compelling. “Without first establishing discipline and maintaining
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. . . .” And the record in
this case surely demonstrates there was a drug-related discipline problem in
Vernonia of “epidemic proportions. . . .” The evidence of a drug-related
sports injury problem at Vernonia, by contrast, was considerably weaker.227

Sure enough, in 2002, the Court abandoned all pretense of linking drug tests to
school sports when it upheld suspicionless drug tests for children involved in
all extracurricular activities.228
If it is nevertheless legitimate for the government to seek to protect the
health of student athletes on the basis that they are not mature enough to make
risk/benefit decisions for themselves, then what about adult athletes? Certainly
the government is entitled to maintain a regulatory system for assuring drug
safety and efficacy. It is illegal, for example, for someone to manufacture and
distribute a drug that has not been shown, to the satisfaction of the Food and
Drug Administration, to be safe and efficacious for its intended purpose.229
Once a drug is approved for one purpose, however, it is lawful to use it for any
other purpose.230 Thus, physicians are allowed to prescribe approved drugs for
so-called “off-label” (i.e., unapproved) purposes,231 and non-physicians can
use non-prescription drugs as they see fit. The only exception is in the case of
substances regulated by the Controlled Substances Act, which limits lawful
uses to legitimate medical purposes.232 As noted earlier, in 1990, Congress
placed anabolic steroids on the list of substances controlled under that Act.233
At the same time, it enacted the following curious provision in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human
growth hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or
227. Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
228. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
229. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
230. David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 693, 695 (1978).
231. Id.
232. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective
must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course of his professional practice.”).
233. See supra note 209.
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other recognized medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 355 of this title and
pursuant to the order of a physician, is guilty of an offense punishable by not
more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are authorized by title 18, or both.234

This language implies that physicians cannot prescribe HGH for an
unapproved purpose, since such a purpose is not “authorized by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services under section 355” (i.e., an indication approved
in labeling for a new drug). If this interpretation is correct, this provision
would constitute an unprecedented intrusion into physicians’ prescribing
authority. Unfortunately, this language was added at the end of congressional
deliberations over the Crime Control Act of 1990 and there is absolutely no
legislative history to explain what Congress intended.235
As noted earlier, a primary concern raised by doping in sports is the lack of
safety data.236 A major justification for government regulation of drug safety
in general is that it is far more efficient for the government to collect, analyze,
and disseminate information about drug safety than to expect individuals to do
this for themselves.237 Therefore, the government clearly has an interest in
promoting the use of safe and effective performance-enhancing drugs. But as
mentioned, many commentators currently consider it unethical to experiment
on humans to determine the safety and efficacy of such substances.238 This
view hampers the ability of the government to regulate these substances, and
robs athletes of the ability to make informed decisions.
One reason why the government may be concerned about the ability of
adult athletes to make risk/benefit decisions for themselves is the pressure they
face to excel. This concern is reinforced by a survey that one writer conducted
of world-class athletes in which more than half of the nearly 200 competitors
interviewed responded that they would take a drug that would enable them to
win every competition for five years and then kill them.239 On top of selfmotivation, athletes may face overwhelming pressure from trainers, coaches,
teammates, and competitors. For example, Ben Johnson’s coach at the time he
234. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (emphasis added).
235. See discussion supra note 3 identifying the unexplained change from the proposed
language of § 333(e)(1) to its final enacted version. The FDA has issued regulatory warnings to
manufacturers and distributors of HGH and HGH-related dietary supplements under § 303(h), but
has not taken any action against physicians who prescribe HGH for unapproved uses. See, e.g.,
Letter from Michael A. Chappell, Department of Human and Health Services, to Tony Sires,
Global Internet Alliance (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g4543d.htm).
236. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
237. Robert T. O’Neill, Regulatory Perspectives on Data Monitoring, 21 STATISTICS MED.
2831, 2831 (2002).
238. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
239. Do Athletes Really Want Killer Drugs, SPORTSLETTER (Amateur Athletic Found., L.A.,
Cal.), Dec. 2003, http://www.aafla.org/10ap/SportsLetter14-4/SLhome.html. Though as the
newsletter explains, some critics deride the survey as unscientific. Id.
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was stripped of his 1988 Olympic gold medal for testing positive for steroids
repeatedly stressed that athletes cannot succeed in highly competitive
environments without the use of drugs,240 and no doubt he impressed this view
on Johnson. Success on the playing field also may be a ticket to higher
education and the rewards of professional sports. Athletes from poorer
backgrounds may be especially vulnerable.241
Yet as discussed earlier, the real risks from performance-enhancing drugs
do not seem to be substantially greater than other risks from sports.242
Moreover, there are many costly things that athletes must do as part of their
training regimen in order to succeed. They must give up sleep, certain foods,
relaxation, recreation, and certain relationships. They must risk their bodily
integrity. They must relinquish a considerable amount of their privacy. They
must undergo drug testing.
In any event, adults presumably have a choice about whether or not to be
athletes. If people do not want to put up with the risks of enhancement drugs,
they can refrain from playing sports, just like someone who does not want to
risk injury from football simply can avoid going out for the team.
2.

Aesthetics

If a major objection to performance-enhancing drugs in sports is based on
aesthetics rather than on protecting health or morals, then a serious question
arises about the legitimacy of government intervention. While Congress
undoubtedly has the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate biomedical enhancements that travel in interstate commerce,243 and
while states can exert their police power to control individual behavior, purely
aesthetic regulation raises serious questions about the limits of state power.
During the early 20th century, courts generally had a hostile view toward
aesthetic regulation. Courts felt that regulations based on aesthetics were too
subjective to justify a state’s use of the police power and had difficulty
accepting the view that aesthetic considerations, as a reflection of beauty,
240. See Randy Starkman, Can Johnson Come Back? TORONTO STAR, Jan. 5, 1991, at B1.
241. Athletics scholarships presently are offered for baseball, basketball, crew (rowing),
cross-country, fencing, football (American), golf, gymnastics, ice hockey, indoor track, lacrosse,
skiing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, volleyball, water polo,
women’s field hockey, and wrestling.
First Point Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.firstpointusa.com/faqs.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). Scholarships in archery,
badminton, bowling, equestrian sports, and squash are available to women only. Id. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that even the most desperate individuals can be prohibited from
using unapproved drugs. See U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1979) (“For the
terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”).
242. See text accompanying supra note 142–43.
243. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this broad authority in upholding federal controls
on medical marijuana. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
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could overcome the difficulty of basing regulations on such a vague and
subjective standard.244 An Ohio Supreme Court case contains a frequently
cited example of the rationale behind the judicial reluctance to recognize
aesthetic regulation as valid:
Certain Legislatures might consider that it was more important to cultivate a
taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for
limericks than for Keats. Successive city councils might never agree as to
what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes the
aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for use restriction upon
property. The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations
were permitted to govern the use of the police power.245

Some courts began to uphold regulations with an aesthetic component if
they found that the law was plausibly related to the traditional health, safety, or
welfare motivations for government intervention. These dual purpose laws
were upheld if the non-aesthetic purpose fit within the traditional definition of
the police power.246 Courts would often engage in a legal fiction in finding a
traditional police power justification for laws that seemed obviously designed
to achieve a primarily aesthetic objective. One early case upheld an ordinance
banning billboards in certain areas, not on the basis that they were unsightly,
but rather on the basis that they provided a hiding place for criminals and a
shelter for illegal activities.247
During this period, similar decisions gave the traditional anti-aesthetic rule
an increasingly narrow interpretation.248 Judges upheld regulations with a
significant aesthetic component as long as the regulation was found to promote
the health, safety, or general welfare.249 Judicial opposition to aesthetic
regulation focused on laws that were enacted entirely on the basis of
aesthetics.250
A major shift in aesthetic jurisprudence came in 1954 with the Supreme
Court decision of Berman v. Parker.251 Although the case involved the
government’s eminent domain power regarding an urban renewal project in
Washington, D.C., the opinion contained in dictum a famous passage

244. Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (1995).
245. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925).
246. James Charles Smith, Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose is a Rose is a Rose, 78
CAL. L. REV. 787, 789 (1990) (book review).
247. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo.
1911).
248. Smith, supra note 246, at 789.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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indicating that aesthetic considerations are within the purview of the police
power:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.252

This passage is credited with ushering in the modern era of judicial acceptance
of regulations based solely on aesthetic considerations.253 Beginning in the
1960s a number of state courts began to uphold the view that regulations could
be based primarily on aesthetic considerations.254 One commentator has noted
that “Berman’s expansive statements continue as a beacon to every court
considering the propriety of aesthetic zoning.”255
One of the earliest and most often cited state court cases to adopt the
modern view of aesthetic regulation was People v. Stover.256 The case
involved a property owner who had erected an unsightly clothesline filled with
old rags in his front yard to express his dissatisfaction with increased city
taxes.257 The city subsequently enacted an ordinance prohibiting clotheslines
in front and side yards.258 The court held that the ordinance was constitutional
despite doubts about the city’s proffered motives of traffic and fire safety,
stating that
it is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an attempt to preserve
the residential appearance of the city and its property values by banning,
insofar as practicable, unsightly clotheslines from yards abutting a public
street. In other words, the statute, though based on what may be termed
aesthetic considerations, proscribes conduct which offends sensibilities and
tends to debase the community and reduce real estate values.259

The rule announced in Stover began to spread to other jurisdictions, and
aesthetic regulations have been most frequently enacted in the context of
junkyards, signs or billboards, and architectural review regulations.260
252. Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted).
253. Michael Pace, Aesthetic Regulation: A New General Rule, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 581, 584
(1987/1988).
254. Id.
255. Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in
Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 484 (1998).
256. 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963).
257. Id. at 273.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 274.
260. Pace, supra note 253, at 585; Kenneth Regan, You Can’t Build That Here: The
Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1018
(1990).
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Often when a court upholds a regulation based “purely” on aesthetic
considerations, another rationale is cited to back up the position. In Stover, the
court mentioned maintaining property values as a supporting reason for
upholding the “purely aesthetic” ordinance prohibiting clotheslines.261 A later
New York decision upholding a local zoning ordinance prohibiting certain
types of billboards declared that its decision did not mean that any aesthetic
consideration suffices to justify prohibition and that “[t]he exercise of the
police power should not extend to every artistic conformity or nonconformity.”262 Rather, the court felt that state power should be limited to
those aesthetic considerations that have a substantial bearing on the “economic,
social, and cultural patterns of a community or district.”263 Several
commentators have also noted the frequency with which other justifications are
cited in upholding regulations on a “purely aesthetic basis.”264 However, this
is not always the case, as some courts have explicitly rejected the idea that
aesthetic regulations must be linked to some other purpose in order to be
sustained as valid.265
Modern courts are undoubtedly much more inclined to uphold regulations
based primarily on aesthetics. Another often-cited opinion describes the trend
as follows:
However, there is a growing judicial recognition of the power of a city to
impose zoning restrictions which can be justified solely upon the ground that
they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings.
This change in attitude is a reflection of the refinement of our tastes and the
growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing society. The change may
be ascribed more directly to the judicial expansion of the police power to

261. Stover, 191 N.E.2d at 274.
262. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755 (N.Y. 1967).
263. Id.
264. See Pace, supra note 253, at 587 (noting that courts frequently take notice of the
economic relationship between aesthetics and tourism in upholding regulations based mainly on
aesthetics); Katherine Dunn Parsons, Billboard Regulation After Metromedia and Lucas, 31
HOUS. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1995) (noting that many contemporary courts continue to link a
regulation’s aesthetic purpose with traditional subjects for exercising police power such as
economics); Poindexter, supra note 255, at 485 (noting that in Berman and the cases following it
allowing purely aesthetic regulation, aesthetics do not stand alone in justifying the regulation).
265. See Taylor v. Town of Plaistow, 872 A.2d 769, 772 (N.H. 2005) (holding that a
municipality may use zoning power solely to advance aesthetic values because preservation or
enhancement of visual environment promotes the general welfare); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v.
Town of Westfield, 324 A.2d 113, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (explicitly rejecting
plaintiff’s contention that ordinances may not be enacted solely for aesthetic reasons but must be
linked to property values in order to be upheld and holding that aesthetics alone are a valid basis
for the police power).
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include within the concept of “general welfare” the enhancement of the
citizen’s cultural life.266

In the 1980s, the Supreme Court had an occasion to revisit the issue of
aesthetic regulation in the context of a California ordinance placing restrictions
on billboards.267 The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds, but reaffirmed that enhancement of the aesthetic
appearance of the city was a legitimate government interest.268 It should be
noted, however, that the city also asserted an alternative rationale—the
enhancement of traffic safety—in support of the ordinance.269
The modern trend has not enjoyed universal support. A number of
jurisdictions continue to hold the view that regulations based on aesthetics
alone are invalid.270 Several commentators have offered critiques of regulating
based on aesthetics.271 Courts also recognize the dangers of subjectivity and
imprecision that can occur with regulations motivated by aesthetics. Even the

266. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (Or. 1965) (en banc).
267. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of S.D., 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981).
268. Id. at 510, 521.
269. Id. at 508–09.
270. See J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Aesthetic Objections or Considerations as Affecting Validity
of Zoning Ordinance, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1226–35 (1968) (collecting and discussing cases from
jurisdictions holding that ordinances based solely or predominantly on aesthetic considerations
are necessarily invalid in the context of zoning).
271. Professor Georgette Poindexter describes aesthetics as a “broad and somewhat
indefinable concept to begin with,” complicated by a lack of clear limits to its applicability.
Poindexter, supra note 255, at 485. She describes how courts have difficulty in finding a clearly
stated legitimate purpose to support purely aesthetic zoning because aesthetics are based on the
subjective notion of beauty, which in itself is impossible to precisely define. Id. She also argues
that the notion that furthering aesthetic values alone constitutes a public good has received little
support because “any argument for public good based solely on beauty evaporates into a
subjective quagmire incapable of definition.” Id. at 486. Professor John Costonis also criticizes
what he perceives as an unjustified beauty-based rationale for legal aesthetics and argues for
substitution of a stability-based rationale centered on promoting individual and social needs for
stability in the face of environmental changes. JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW,
AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE xv (1989). He critiques both the reasoning used by
courts when asserting that government may regulate solely for aesthetics and judges’ “clumsy
attempts to found legal aesthetics’ public purpose in beauty.” Id. at 78. He is dismayed by the
conclusory statements of many courts that the promotion of community aesthetics is in the
public’s best interest and thus appropriate for regulation. Id. Costonis also subscribes to the view
that it is impossible to achieve coherent standards in a beauty-based legal aesthetics system
because beauty cannot be “confined by standards.” Id. at 80. Because modern courts have failed
both to provide a legitimate underlying rationale for the legitimacy of aesthetic regulation and to
coherently articulate the limits of state power in promoting aesthetic values, Costonis believes
that the current state of such regulation cannot stand. Smith, supra note 246, at 792. Costonis
advocates a stability based rationale because in his opinion, such a system would provide more
workable standards on which to base decisions as well as more clearly defined limits to the state’s
power. Id. at 793.
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Supreme Court, while upholding aesthetic considerations as a valid basis for
regulation, recognized that aesthetic judgments “are necessarily subjective,
defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized
to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible
purpose.”272 Another opinion recognized the inherently subjective nature of
aesthetics and declared that “courts cannot act as arbiters of proper aesthetics
and good taste, and should not enjoin an activity solely because it causes some
aesthetic discomfort or annoyance.”273 Language found in other opinions
generally echoes these concerns about imprecision and subjectivity.274 Critics
of aesthetic regulation also view it as an unnecessary extension of the police
power that has the potential to set a dangerous precedent for government
encroachment on individual liberties and property rights and a symbol of overintrusive government.275
Even if the government has the power to legislate aesthetic values, it is
important to consider how appropriate it is to exercise that power to
criminalize the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports. On the one
hand, there are those who say that the government has a legitimate role in
furthering community values.276 Communitarians espouse the idea that “it is
entirely proper for the state to promote particular conceptions of the good.”277
On the other hand, others maintain that the government should interfere as
little as possible with individual freedom.278 Consistent with this latter view,
the government should be reluctant to attempt to control personal aesthetics—
that is, the aesthetic component of personal behavior or appearance.279

272. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510.
273. Saurer v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 629 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
274. See Damurjian v. Bd. of Adjustment, 690 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (recognizing that while aesthetics are a legitimate aim of zoning, accomplishing it through
clearly defined limits is difficult because the concept of aesthetics is abstract and subjective,
leading to difficulty with legislative attempts to quantify it and establish standards); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175, 196 (1st Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing aesthetic-based regulations from public safety regulations on ground that aesthetic
regulations often stem from subjective assessments not easily amenable to objective measurement
or empirical refutation).
275. Regan, supra note 260, at 1027–28.
276. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 6–7 (1984).
277. Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 445
(2000).
278. See SANDEL, supra note 276, at 1, 6–7.
279. Obviously the First Amendment severely limits the government’s ability to control the
aesthetics of speech or artistic expression. However, it would be difficult to regard the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in sports as protected by the First Amendment. For example,
witness the debate over the ritual use of peyote (a hallucinogenic drug) in Native American
religious ceremonies. If the Supreme Court is unwilling to allow the use of illegal drugs in
conjunction with the exercise of religion, it seems particularly unlikely that they would sanction
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Reconciling liberalism and communitarianism is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it seems reasonable that, given the importance of the
nation’s liberal tradition and the danger of excessive state power, the
government should not regulate the aesthetics of sports except under the most
egregious circumstances. An example might be creating a visibly chimerical
human athlete—that is, an athlete who had been genetically engineered to
combine the physical features of human and animal.280 Short of such extreme
cases, the government would be wise to leave the regulation of adult doping to
sports organizations themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever one may think of the use of performance-enhancing drugs in
sports and of the proper role of government in effectuating anti-doping policy,
it is important to distinguish between performance-enhancement in sports and
in non-sports endeavors. Outside of sports (as well as games, and perhaps
some arts), human accomplishments are valued primarily for the social benefits
they confer, rather than for the way in which they are achieved. A composer
who completes a masterpiece in a few minutes or with little formal training
produces music that is just as beautiful as if it took years of training and labor.
A researcher who discovers a cure for cancer by accident is just as likely to
win a Nobel Prize as one who engages in meticulous experimentation. The
only qualification is that the result must not be stolen from someone else’s
work.
It therefore is important that the antipathy toward performanceenhancement in sports, if it persists, does not carry over into other realms of
human activity. Performance-enhancement could yield significant benefits to
society. For instance, drugs being developed to treat Alzheimer’s disease have
been shown to improve cognitive performance in healthy volunteers.281 Better
cognition could improve workplace and scholarly productivity, increase
transportation safety, and accelerate scientific progress. If the notion that
performance-enhancement is evil propels the government to ban enhancementuses of these drugs, this societal benefit would be lost.
A glimpse of this attitude can be seen in Congress’s recent hostility toward
funding access to Viagra under Medicare and Medicaid.282 True, it may be
violations of controlled substance regulations in the name of improved athletic performance. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
280. An example is provided by the cover illustration of ANDY MIAH, GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ATHLETES: BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, GENE DOPING AND SPORT (2004) (“Cheetah-man,”
by Daniel Lee, 1999).
281. See J. A. Yesavage et al., Donepezil and Flight Simulator Performance: Effects on
Retention of Complex Skills, 59 NEUROLOGY 123, 123–24 (2002).
282. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Rejects Coverage of Impotence Pills, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2005, at A10.
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harder to argue that enhancing sexual performance confers societal benefit, in
contrast, say, to enhancing cognition. But if Congress’s attitude toward Viagra
is the shape of things to come, then society will lose countless benefits merely
to satisfy the tastes, and cater to the fears, of some of its members.
APPENDIX A:
STATE STEROID REGULATION AND SCHEDULING

STATE

SCHEDULE

Alabama

III

Alaska

N/A

Arizona

III

Arkansas

III

California

III

Colorado

III

CITATION

OTHER SPECIAL LAWS AND
INFORMATION

ALA. STATE BD. OF
HEALTH RULES CH.
420-7-2

Alabama State Board of Health may
add, delete, or reschedule all
controlled substances. ALA. CODE §
20-2-20 (2004). The State Board of
Health’s scheduling of controlled
substances may be found at Ch. 4207-2 of its Rules, available at
http://www.adph.org/administration/
controlled.pdf.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
36-2514 (2004)

Medical professionals can lose their
licenses for misdispensing steroids.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1451
(2004).

The Arkansas Controlled Substance
List is available at
Arkansas Controlled
http://www.sosweb.state.ar.us/electi
Substance List
ons/elections_pdfs/register/sept-03reg/007.07.03-001.pdf.
Illegal to advertise steroids (BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 17533.10); warnings
must be posted in athletic facilities
(CIVIL CODE § 1812.97); education
for students (EDUC. CODE § 51261);
CAL. HEALTH &
teacher training (EDUC. CODE §
SAFETY CODE §
51262); supplements with precursors
11056 (2003)
must have warning labels (HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 110423);
misdemeanor to sell precursors to
minors (HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11100).
COLO. REV. STAT. §

Medical professionals can lose their
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18-18-205 (2005)

Connecticut

III

District of
Columbia

III

Delaware

III

Florida

III

Georgia

III

Hawaii

III

Idaho

III

licenses for misdispensing steroids.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-116
(2005). Prescriptions for steroids
must include the reason for the
prescription. Id. § 12-22-123.

CONN. GEN. STAT. §
21a-243 (2004)
D.C. CODE § 48902.08 (2001)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 4718 (2005)
FLA. STAT. § 893.03
(2003)
GA. CODE ANN. §
16-13-27 (2003)
HAW. REV. STAT. §
329-18 (2004)
IDAHO CODE ANN. §
37-2709 (2000)

720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 570/208
(2000)

Education programs (20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 301/20-15 (2004)); steroid
offenses deserve harshest penalties
(720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/411
(2002)); prescription controls (720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/308–12).

Illinois

III

Indiana

III

Iowa

III

Kansas

III

KAN. STAT. ANN. §
65-4109 (2002)

Kentucky

III

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 218A.090
(2005)

Louisiana

III

Specifically criminalizes anabolic
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
steroids. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
§ 40:964 (2004)
40:968 (2001).

Maine

N/A

Maryland

III

IND. CODE § 35-482-8 (2001)
IOWA CODE §
124.208 (2003)

MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 5-404
(2002)

Medical professionals can lose their
licenses for misdispensing steroids.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836 (2002).

Notices must be posted in athletic
facilities. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 5-710 (2002).
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Massachusetts

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

III

Michigan

N/A

Minnesota

III

Mississippi

III

Missouri

III

Montana

III

Nebraska

III

Nevada

III

New
Hampshire

III

New Jersey

N/A

New Mexico

III

New York

II

North Carolina III
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MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 94C, § 2 (1997)
Notices detailing penalties must be
posted in athletic facilities. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.26302 (2001).
Trafficking in anabolic steroids can
be prosecuted under racketeering
statutes. Id. § 750.159g.
MINN. STAT. §
152.02 (2005)
MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-29-117 (2001)
MO. REV. STAT. §
195.017 (2005)
MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-32-226 (1997)

NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-405 (2005)

Students at state schools can be
barred from extra-curriculars for
steroid use. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79296 (2003). State employees can be
fired for steroid convictions and not
rehired for a year thereafter. Id. §
48-233.

NEV. REV. STAT. §
453.011 (1999)
N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 318-B:1
(2001)
Education programs for K-12 (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:40A-3 (1999));
students can get in trouble for steroid
use (Id. § 18A:40A-23); teachers can
receive training about steroids (Id. §
18A:40A-3).
A full table of controlled substances
N.M. STAT. § 30-31- is available at
5 (2005)
http://www.state.nm.us/pharmacy/co
ntrolledsubstances.html.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3306 (2003)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-91 (2001)
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III

N.D. CENT. CODE §
19-03.1-09 (2003)

Ohio

III

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3719.41
(2005)

Oklahoma

III

OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 2-208 (2004)

Oregon

N/A

Pennsylvania

III

35 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 780-104 (2005)

Rhode Island

III

R.I. GEN. LAWS §
21-28-2.08 (2002)

Tennessee

Texas

Public grade schools (6-12), public
universities, and private athletic
facilities must post notices. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.752,
3345.41, 3705.50 (2005).
Professionals can lose their licenses
for drug (including steroid) offenses.
Id. § 2925.38. Prescriptions can
only be written in accordance with
Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic
Act. Id. § 3719.06
Prescriptions can only be written for
valid medical purposes. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, § 2-312.1 (2004).
Students must be educated about
steroids and can get in trouble at
schools for using; schools must ban
steroids. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§
807.1–3 (2003). Prescriptions must
include a valid reason and
professionals can lose their license
for writing a prescription for
enhancement. Id. §§ 807.4–5.
Coaches must warn students about
steroids. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-11.12 (2001).
Non-medical personnel cannot
distribute steroids. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-53-1530 (2000). Professionals
can lose their license for
misprescribing. Id. § 44-53-1520.

South Carolina N/A

South Dakota

67

III

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 34-20B-22 (2000)

III

TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-410 (2000)

III

TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.104 (2003)

Physicians cannot prescribe for
enhancement. TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-17-430 (2003).
No prescriptions for enhancement.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.071 (2003). Grade schools
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Utah

III

Vermont

N/A

Virginia

III

Washington

III

West Virginia

III

Wisconsin

III

Wyoming

III

UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-4 (2003)

VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-3450 (2005)
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and universities must post warnings.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.008,
51.921 (1996).
Physicians can lose their licenses for
enhancement prescriptions. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-6 (2003).
Students are ineligible for
interscholastic sports if they use
steroids. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1276.3 (2003). School employees can
be fired for dispensing steroids. Id.
§ 22.1-292.2. Reporting
requirements exist for students
suspected of using steroids. Id. §
22.1-279.3:1. Bans exist on caffeine
pills and ephedra. Id. § 18.2-248.5.

WASH. REV. CODE §
69.50.208 (2005)
W. VA. CODE §
60A-2-208 (2002)
WIS. STAT. § 961.18
(2005)
WYO. STAT. ANN. §
35-7-1017 (2005)

APPENDIX B:
STATE STEROID LAW CITATIONS
STATE
Alabama
Alaska

CITATION

SUBJECT MATTER

ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-210–219
(2005)

Drug Possession and Sale Offenses

ALA. CODE §§ 20-2-20–32 (2005)

Standards and Schedules

Nothing found

Controlled by federal law

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3401–3422
Drug Offenses
(2004)
Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1422 (2004)

Licensing Doctors

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1522 (2004)

Licensing Naturopathic Physicians

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1822 (2004)

Licensing Osteopathic Physicians

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2521 (2004)

Licensing Physician Assistants

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2912 (2004)

Licensing Homeopathic Physicians
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2511–2516
Schedules
(2004)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2531 (2004)

Arkansas

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2541–2544
(2004)
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-101–
1303 (2005)
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
17533.10 (2005)
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.97 (2005)
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44645 (2005)
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51262 (2005)

California

Colorado

Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
11053–11058 (2005)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11377 (2005)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11999.2 (2005)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
110423–110423.6 (2005)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-18-101–
605 (2004)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-123
(2005)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117
(2004)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-38-117
(2004)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-240–315
(2005)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4701–
4796 (2005)
D.C. CODE §§ 48-901.01–907.03
(2005)

Florida

FLA. STAT. §§ 893.01–.20 (2005)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-20–56
(2004)

Offenses and Penalties
Enforcement and Administration
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Unlawful To Advertise Anabolic
Steroids
Warnings Must Be Posted in
Athletic Facilities
Teachers To Receive Training
About Anabolics
Education About Steroids: Grades
7–12
Controlled Substances Act,
Schedules
Simple Possession Is a
Misdemeanor
Teaching Materials Cannot
Promote Use of Anabolics
Supplements with Precursors Must
Have Warning Labels
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Prescriptions for Anabolic Steroids
Must Include Reason for
Prescription
Licensing Doctors
Licensing Nurses
Dependency Producing Drugs
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Controlled Substances Act
Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control
Regulation of Controlled
Substances
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Hawaii
Idaho
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HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-1–128
(2004)
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2701–
2751 (2005)
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 301/20-15
(2005)

Illinois

Iowa

IND. CODE §§ 16-42-19-1–28
(2004)
IND. CODE §§ 35-48-2-1–7-15
(2004)
IOWA CODE §§ 124.101–.602
(2004)
IOWA CODE §§ 126.1–.26 (2004)

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Michigan

Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Department of Human Services
Can Create Education Programs
About Steroids
Education About Steroids: Grades
7–12
Criminalizes Non-medical
Distribution of HGH

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.3
(2006)
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/3.22
(2005)
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/100–603
Illinois Controlled Substances Act
(2005)
IND. CODE § 16-18-2-15 (2004)

Indiana
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Defines steroids
Indiana Legend Drug Act
Controlled Substances
Controlled Substances
Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics

Steroids Without a Prescription
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837 (2005) Constitutes Unprofessional
Conduct
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4101–4143
Controlled Substances Act
(2005)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.010–
Controlled Substances
994 (2004)
Uniform Controlled Dangerous
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:961–
1003 (2005)
Substances Law
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1239
Anabolic Steroids
(2005)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§
Drugs
1101–1118 (2005)
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 5Controlled Dangerous Substances,
101–1101 (2004)
Prescriptions, and Other Substances
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1–
Controlled Substances Act
48 (2005)
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.7101–
Controlled Substances
.7545 (2005)
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.26301– Steroid Warnings at Athletic
26306 (2005)
Facilities
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MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.159g
(2004)
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.411j
(2004)
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Drugs, Controlled Substances

MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-101–
187 (2005)
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 195.003–.515
(2005)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102
(2005)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-32-101–
502 (2005)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-401–457
(2004)

Uniform Controlled Substances
Law

NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-296 (2005)
Nevada
New
Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

Trafficking in Steroids Can Be
Charged Under Racketeering
Statutes
In Terms of Penalties, Steroid
Offenses are Grouped with
Controlled Substances

MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01–.21 (2004)

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-233 (2005)

NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453.011–.348
(2004)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-B:1–
30 (2004)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:40A-1–7.2
(2005)
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8:65-10.1–.5
(2005)
N.M. STAT. §§ 30-31-1–41 (2005)

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306
New York
(2005)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-87–113.8
North Carolina
(2005)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-01–
North Dakota
46 (2005)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2925.01–
.52 (2005)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.752
Ohio
(2005)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.41
(2005)

71

Drug Regulation
Criminal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs
Controlled Substances
Crimes and Punishments: Drugs
and Narcotics
State Employees Who Take
Steroids
Students Taking Steroids Can Be
Barred from Extracurriculars
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Controlled Drug Act
Education and Substance Abuse
Scheduling
Controlled Substances
Controlled Substances Act,
Scheduling
North Carolina Controlled
Substances Act
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Drug Offenses
Public Schools Must Post Warnings
in Locker Rooms for Grades 6–12
State Universities Must Post
Warnings in Locker Rooms
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Oklahoma
Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.50
(2005)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3719.01–
.99 (2005)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-101–610
(2004)
OR. REV. STAT §§ 475.005–.295
(2003)
35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-101–144
(2005)
35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 807.1–.2
(2005)

Tennessee

Texas

Utah
Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Public and Private Athletic
Facilities Must Post Warnings
Controlled Substances
Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act
Steroids in Schools

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-11.1-2 (2004)

Coaches Must Deliver Preseason
Lectures About Steroids

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28-1.01–
6.01 (2004)

Uniform Controlled Substances Act

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-90 (2005)

Crimes Classified as Felonies

South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-53-1510–
1550 (2004)
South Dakota
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S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-20B-1–
114 (2004)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-401–
451 (2004)
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.008
(2005)
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.921
(2005)
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 481.001–.205 (2005)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-1–21
(2005)

Poisons, Drugs, and Other
Controlled Substances: Anabolic
Steroids
Drugs and Substances Control
Drugs
Schools Must Post Warnings About
Steroids
Public Colleges and Universities
Must Post Warnings
Texas Controlled Substances Act
Utah Controlled Substances Act

Nothing found

Controlled by federal law

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-247–265
(2005)
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.08
(2005)
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3400–3472
(2005)
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.41.300–
.900 (2005)

Crimes Involving Health and
Safety: Drugs
Drugs in Schools
Drug Control Act
Use of Steroids
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WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.41.010–
.900 (2005)
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.101–
.609 (2005)
W.VA. CODE §§ 60A-1-101–10-15
(2005)

73

Legend Drugs: Prescription Drugs
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Uniform Controlled Substances Act

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. §§ 961.001–.67 (2004)

Uniform Controlled Substances Act

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-7-1001–
1060 (2005)

Controlled Substances

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

74

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:15

